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1. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
1.1 Routes towards the understanding of other minds 
It has always been a great puzzle to us how we can understand the minds of other people and 
accurately predict their behaviour, especially as we lack any privileged access to other minds 
as we have to our own. Many great thinkers in history have attempted to answer this question, 
proposing different solutions (Hume, 1739/1978; Lipps, 1903; Merleau-Ponty, 1962), but till 
now, reaching into the contemporary debate, the puzzle is far from solved. Nowadays it is 
commonly considered that in social cognition there exist two main routes towards 
understanding the other’s inner world (Frith & Frith, 2012; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Singer, 
2006, 2012). On the one hand there exists a cognitive route often termed Theory of Mind 
(ToM), which represents the ability to understand the mental states of others, such as beliefs 
and intentions (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), and on the other hand there the affective route in 
empathy, which represents the ability to understand and share feelings of others (Batson, 
2009; Eisenberg, 2000; Singer, 2012; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Singer et al., 2004). Both 





Figure 1.1. Schematic depiction of the Theory of Mind (ToM) network and the empathy network. 
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Neuroimaging studies have shown that Theory of Mind involves a particular set of brain 
regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the precuneus and posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC), right and left temporo parietal junction (r/lTPJ), and bilateral temporal poles 
(Aichhorn, Perner, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009), whereas empathy relies on another set of brain 
regions, such as the  bilateral insulae, and the middle cingulate cortex (MCC, Lamm, Decety, 
& Singer, 2011; Singer et al., 2004). Besides these two routes there is a potential third route 
towards understanding the other in social cognition. This research is based around the 
discovery of the “mirror neuron system” (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), which 
describes a particular set of neurons in the monkey and human brain that tend to respond 
when a goal-directed action is observed by an agent, as well as when the agent performs the 
goal-directed action him/herself. The mirror neuron system has potential implications for 
imitation and our ability to represent goals and intentions of others, while possibly 
representing a basis for higher order routes of social cognition such as aforementioned ToM 
and empathy (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Within the human brain the mirror neuron systems 
is assumed to be comprised of the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), ventral premotor cortex, and 
the caudal part of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Dinstein, 
Hasson, Rubin, & Heeger, 2007; Etzel, Gazzola, & Keysers, 2008; Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & 
Keysers, 2006). It has to be noticed that the exact functional role of the mirror neuron system 
remains elusive, and that whether mirror neurons really code for intentions of agents is still a 
topic of debate (Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Heyes, 
2010). The existence of mirror neurons has been commonly interpreted as a support for 
‘simulation accounts’ (Gallese, 2001; Gallese & Goldman, 1998), which broadly suggest that 
other people’s actions, sensations and feelings are understood via activations of the neural 
representations corresponding to these states. For ToM as well as empathy the processes of 
simulation and projection have been suggested as crucial mechanisms to understand the inner 
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world of another person (e.g. Gallese, 2001; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Mitchell, 2009; 
Nickerson, 2001; Silani, Lamm, Ruff, & Singer, 2013; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). 
These simulation accounts of ToM and empathy have been most strongly supported by 
findings showing that shared neural activations between self and other underlie our ability to 
represent the internal states of others (Mitchell, 2009; Singer et al., 2004). It has to be noted 
here however that simulation and projection might be by no means the exclusive mechanisms 
towards understanding other minds, as different theoretical propositions have been made and 
are still debated, which also do not have to be considered mutually exclusive (Bohl & van den 
Bos, 2012; Gallagher, 2001; Saxe, 2005). 
 
 
1.2 When simulation fails and egocentricity arises 
While simulation and projection represent fundamental mechanisms in social cognition 
towards understanding other minds, they can become inefficient as soon as one’s own mental 
state or internal experience differs to that of another person. For instance it would be 
erroneous to assume someone was happy while he clearly is sad just because we ourselves 
feel happy. The tendency to project one’s own mental states onto others has been broadly 
termed as egocentricity bias. 
In the domain of ToM egocentricity has been commonly reported and findings show 
that egocentricity can even be detected in healthy adults (Pronin, 2008; Royzman, Cassidy, & 
Baron, 2003). Exemplary for such a “cognitive egocentricity” in ToM, has been reasoning 
about false beliefs, during which a person A has to detach from his/her true belief about an 
object X to consider the false belief of a person B about object X. In such a circumstance a 
simple simulation mechanism would fail to accurately make sense of another persons’ 
incongruent mental state (false belief in this case) and lead to egocentrically biased 
1. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
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judgments. To avoid such egocentrically biased judgments, a self-other distinction mechanism 
differentiating between self and other perspectives must be in place. This so called self-other 
distinction has been proposed to play a key role in social cognitive processes (Brass, Ruby, & 
Spengler, 2009; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003; Santiesteban, White, 
et al., 2012). A key brain region that seems adequately suited for distinguishing and switching 
between self and other perspectives in the cognitive domain, being a hub of both interoceptive 
and exteroceptive information pathways is the so-called temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). TPJ 
has shown to be consistently recruited during belief reasoning and perspective-taking 
(Aichhorn et al., 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Ramsey, Hansen, Apperly, & Samson, 2013; 
Sommer et al., 2007). In particular the right TPJ, has been suggested to play a major role 
during ToM (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), especially when a difference in perspective exists 
between self and other (Aichhorn et al., 2006; Sommer et al., 2007). Furthermore it has 
however been proposed that rTPJ plays a much more general role in self-other distinction 
which extends from the cognitive into the motor domain. Results from meta analyses (Bzdok 
et al., 2013; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Silani et al., 2013) and also single studies showed a 
relation between the inhibition of spontaneous imitation tendencies (i.e. self-other distinction 
in the motor domain) and ToM abilities (Santiesteban, White, et al., 2012; Spengler, von 
Cramon, & Brass, 2009, 2010). Strong evidence comes from a  recent study using transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS) of rTPJ showing that rTPJ is causally involved in 
differentiating self and other representations during imitation inhibition and cognitive 
perspective-taking (Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012). Thus findings so far 
suggest that rTPJ functioning might be crucial in differentiating self and other perspectives in 
the cognitive domain, and therefore subsequently in helping to overcome cognitive 
egocentricity during ToM. 
In the domain of empathy, egocentricity has not been investigated until recently. Some 
initial studies have however looked at egocentricity during attributing visceral states (Van 
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Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). In previous empathy studies emotional states of the person who 
empathizes and the person suffering were never incongruent (Singer et al., 2004; Singer et al., 
2006). However this does not seem likely and representative of everyday life, where the 
constant ebbing and flowing of thoughts and feelings permits perfect alignment of individual 
minds. Thus overcoming emotional egocentricity during empathic judgments might be of 
similar importance to overcoming egocentricity during ToM reasoning, to eventually arrive at 
an accurate understanding of another person’s mental state. A study by Silani et al. (2013) 
recently demonstrated that healthy adults show an emotional egocentricity bias (EEB) when 
judging the emotional state of another person that was incongruent to their own, while the 
right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) was functionally implicated in overcoming emotional 
egocentricity. Peaks of this activation were distinct from other subregions of temporo-parietal 
cortex involved in ToM. The specific role of rSMG in overcoming EEB and thus self-other 
distinction in the affective domain was buttressed by findings of an increased EEB when 
disrupting rSMG with repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation. In line with these findings, 
a study by Steinbeis, Bernhardt, and Singer (2014) showed that children displayed increased 
emotional egocentricity compared to adults related to reduced activation of rSMG. In a 
complementary resting-state connectivity analysis rSMG stronger functional connectivity to 
regions of the empathy network, such as the MCC and bilateral anterior insulae (AI), 
extending to inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
while rTPJ showed stronger functional connectivity to nodes of the ToM network, including 
the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the precuneus. Taken together these findings 
corroborate the hypothesis that the broader area usually referred to as temporal parietal cortex 
consists of important subdivisions that in turn might subserve different functions in the 
context of social cognition respectively. Within the affective route towards understanding the 
other, rSMG seems to be implicated in overcoming emotional egocentricity, whereas within 
1. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
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the cognitive route of ToM, rTPJ seems to play an important role in overcoming cognitive 




Figure 1.2. The rSMG region depicted consists of an overlap of activations of two fMRI experiments 
looking at the neuronal basis of the EEB using the ETOP (Silani et al., 2013). The rTPJ region was 
taken from a meta-analytic activation during ToM (Mar, 2011).  
 
 
Increased cognitive egocentricity has been a particularly striking phenomenon in 
children and various mental disorders, leading to a wealth of scientific investigation there of. 
In contrast emotional egocentricity has so far not been adequately addressed in previous 
research, despite being of equal importance in regards to social cognition in children and adult 
psychopathologies. This dissertation thus represents an attempt to answer relevant questions 
about emotional egocentricity and its causes in child development and adult psychopathology. 
In the subsequent parts a short overview will be given about what is presently known about 
egocentricity in the domain of child development and in the domain of adult 
psychopathology, with the specific focus for the latter on Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
and Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). 
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1.3 Egocentricity in child development 
Egocentricity in child development has been a commonly reported phenomenon (Elkind, 
1967; Flavell, 1999; Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). The term egocentrism in 
developmental psychology originates most prominently from the work of Jean Piaget, in 
which each of his developmental stages of cognitive development has been associated with its 
unique egocentrism to be overcome. Equally influential has been Kohlberg’s work on 
children’s egocentrism during moral development (Kohlberg, 1976). Kohlberg showed that 
children from to 2 to 9 tended to solve moral scenarios mostly from an egocentric perspective, 
reasoning morally particularly when it benefited the self (Kohlberg, 1976). Egocentricity 
during visual perspective taking has been investigated by Piaget & Inhalder (1956), with the 
famous “three mountains” task,  in which children at the age of 7 exhibit difficulties judging 
someone else’s visual perspective which differs from their own. Subsequent research has thus 
focused predominantly on investigating developmental egocentricity in children in the domain 
of social cognition using visual perspective taking and ToM tasks (Birch & Bloom, 2007; 
Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Pronin, 2008; Royzman et al., 2003; Thomas & 
Jacoby, 2012). Children generally exhibit stronger egocentricity during visual perspective 
taking and Theory of Mind tasks than adults. Before the age of 4 children have difficulties 
attributing false beliefs to other people, unable to detach from their own true beliefs, leading 
to egocentrically biased judgments (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Also, throughout childhood 
difficulties in visual perspective taking and Theory of Mind (ToM) seem to persist (Apperly, 
Warren, Andrews, Grant, & Todd, 2011; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Sommerville, Bernstein, 
& Meltzoff, 2013).  
While strong evidence for egocentricity in the cognitive domain in children as well as 
adults has accumulated over the past decades, very little research focused on investigating 
egocentricity in the affective domain (see O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012; Repacholi & Gopnik, 
1997; Silani et al., 2013; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003) and only one study has so far 
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looked specifically at emotional egocentricity  and its neural correlates in children (Steinbeis 
et al., 2014). The findings of this study showed that children between the ages of 6 and 12 
displayed increased emotional egocentricity compared to adults which was related to reduced 
activation of rSMG in the brain as well as reduced coupling between rSMG and DLPFC. 
These findings provided evidence for the neural correlates of increased emotional 
egocentricity in children, however the exact underlying mechanisms of age-related 
differences in emotional egocentricity still remain to be identified. 
 
 
1.4 Egocentricity in adult psychopathology 
Many psychological disorders are known to have profound disturbances in social functioning 
(Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; Decety & Meyer, 2008). Egocentrism and self-centeredness 
during social functioning are among the most common symptoms for a wide range of 
psychopathologies (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Blair, Peschardt, Budhani, Mitchell, 
& Pine, 2006; Brüne, 2005; Taber-Thomas et al., 2014; Wolkenstein, Schönenberg, Schirm, 
& Hautzinger, 2011). In the following sections Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) will be introduced, with the focus on the specific characteristics 
of social cognition deficits in these disorders. 
 
1.4.1 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
ASD is a common, early-onset neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by impairments in 
social communication, interaction, and stereotyped or repetitive behaviours and interests 
(American Psychiatrc Association, 2013). Some of the social deficits in ASD, as the term 
‘autism’ (from ‘autos’, greek for self) suggests, have been linked to an unusual egocentrism. 
Already in his original paper Asperger (1944) described the children he studied as being 
1. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
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“egocentric to the extreme”. Consequently, one of the most consistently reported social 
cognition deficits in ASD has been in Theory of Mind (ToM, Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Frith & Frith, 2012; Happé, 1994). When engaging in 
ToM tasks, egocentrism of individuals with ASD is for example evidenced by their increased 
difficulty in passing false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Begeer, Bernstein, van 
Wijhe, Scheeren, & Koot, 2012; Schneider, Slaughter, Bayliss, & Dux, 2013; Senju et al., 
2010; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). It has been proposed that the underlying 
problem in ToM and in particular false belief understanding for individuals with ASD are 
difficulties in differentiating between representations of one’s own mental state and that of 
others, also known as self-other distinction (Lombardo & Baron-Cohen, 2011). Adding 
support to this notion TPJ, which has been implicated in self-other distinction as mentioned 
above has been shown to be structurally and functionally abnormal in ASD and linked to 
social deficits (Castelli et al., 2002; David et al., 2013; Kana, Libero, Hu, Deshpande, & 
Colburn, 2012; Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, & Baron-Cohen, 2011; Mueller et al., 
2013; Pitskel, Bolling, Hudac, et al., 2011; Washington et al., 2013). Whether empathy, 
representing the affective route towards understanding other minds is deficient in ASD 
remains still a point of debate (Bird & Cook, 2013; Bird et al., 2010; Hadjikhani et al., 2014). 
Some findings however suggest that social deficits in ASD are much less pronounced in the 
affective domain. For example there is evidence that individuals with ASD might show intact 
empathy (Bird et al., 2010; Dziobek et al., 2008; Jones, Happé, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 
2010; Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 2013) and if they show empathic deficits, that these 
might rather relate to the comorbidity of alexithymia than to the diagnosis of ASD itself (e.g. 
Bird et al., 2010; Silani et al., 2008). Alexithymia is characterized by difficulties in 
identifying and describing one’s own emotional state (Sifneos, 1973), and has been shown to 
be normally distributed in the general population (Franz et al., 2008). It has been found that 
individuals with high alexithymic traits do show deficits in empathy and emotional 
1. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
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awareness, which among other brain regions is linked to deficits in AI functioning (Bird et al., 
2010; Moriguchi et al., 2007; Silani et al., 2008). Whether egocentrism in ASD extends from 
the cognitive domain of ToM further into the affective domain of empathy, has yet to be 
investigated.  
Another mental disorder having been described to show blatant egocentrism in social 
cognition is Major Depressive Disorder, which is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
1.4.2 Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) 
MDD has been characterized by increased negative self-focused thoughts, as well as apathy 
and social withdrawal (American Psychiatric Association, Association, 2013), and is 
sometimes described as a disorder of the self (Northoff, 2007). Thus, impairments in social 
functioning are often reported (Hirschfeld et al., 2000). However, the exact nature of social 
cognition deficits MDD still remains elusive. Some studies using subjective as well as 
objective measures do suggest that MDD patients do show cognitive egocentricity during 
ToM reasoning (Inoue, Tonooka, Yamada, & Kanba, 2004; Schreiter & Pijnenborg, 2013; 
Wolkenstein et al., 2011; Zobel et al., 2010). Other findings suggest no difference in ToM 
reasoning between MDD patients and healthy controls (Schreiter & Pijnenborg, 2013; Thoma 
et al., 2011; Wilbertz, Brakemeier, Zobel, Härter, & Schramm, 2010). These mixed results 
might have been due to not having accounted for executive functions in depression, which do 
play an important part in more complex ToM reasoning (Thoma et al., 2011; Zobel et al., 
2010). Similarly within the domain of empathy, mixed results have been reported, with the 
greatest consensus on heightened personal distress (Schreiter & Pijnenborg, 2013), the self-
oriented, aversive emotional reaction, such as anxiety or discomfort, towards another person’s 
emotional state (Davis, 1980). With regards to empathy deficits in depression, similarly to the 
case of autism, the role of alexithymia, a common comorbid personality trait in depression 
1. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
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(Honkalampi, Hintikka, Tanskanen, Lehtonen, & Viinamäki, 2000; Taylor & Bagby, 2004), 
has to be closely considered. Thus, empathy deficits in depression may well be associated 
with alexithymia, but further research is needed for clarification. While empathic deficits 
could relate to comorbid alexithymia in depression, it remains totally unclear whether 
individuals with depression show increased egocentric bias during empathic relating, when 
emotional perspectives of self and other differ, and how this would be affected by concurrent 
alexithymia. 
In the next sections the different research questions that motivated the three studies of the 
present dissertation will be introduced and discussed. 
 
 
1.5 Research questions 
1.5.1 Why do children show increased emotional egocentricity? 
Prior work has shown that children display increased emotional egocentricity compared to 
adults and provided a coherent account of the neural mechanisms leading to this 
developmental change (Steinbeis et al., 2014). What is still missing and has not been 
addressed in previous research, is a systematic analysis of the exact cognitive and affective 
mechanisms that may account for observed age-related differences in emotional egocentricity 
during development. This question was addressed in study 1 using a newly developed 
paradigm based on visuo-gustatory stimulation, the EEB Taste-Paradigm (ETAP). During the 
ETAP participants are asked to judge the pleasantness of their own taste experiences or that of 
another person, while both can have congruent or incongruent taste experiences. Pilot work 
indicated that gustatory stimulation elicits equal feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness 
in children and adults, making it highly suited to study developmental differences in EEB as 
1. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
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well as extending the phenomenon of EEB to another stimulus modality. As in the previous 
study (Steinbeis et al., 2014), it was expected that children would show an increased EEB 
compared to adults, which would decrease with age. As overcoming such EEB presumably 
relies on a multitude of higher- and lower-level cognitive and affective processes, we aimed 
to comprehensively test for these possible processes underlying the developmental differences 
in EEB using a large battery of tasks. Among those processes tested in relation to emotional 
egocentricity, were processing speed, attentional reorienting, response inhibition, visual 
perspective taking, emotion regulation and conflict processing. The findings of Steinbeis et al. 
(2014) already showed that children’s increased emotional egocentricity could not be 
explained by abilities in response inhibition, attentional reorienting or ToM reasoning. 
However to replicate these results in this study measuring emotional egocentricity using the 
ETAP, a response inhibition and attentional reorienting task were again included. Cognitive 
egocentricity was measured with a visual perspective-taking task that was much closer in 
design to the ETAP than the previously used ToM reasoning task, varying the congruency of 
self and other perspectives. Based on Steinbeis et al. (2014), some prime candidates were of 
particular interest in explaining increased emotional egocentricity in children, namely conflict 
processing and emotion regulation. While the DLPFC is crucially involved in overcoming 
emotional egocentricity it also plays an important role in conflict processing as well as 
emotion regulation (Badre & Wagner, 2004; Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008; Egner & 
Hirsch, 2005; Lévesque et al., 2003), two abilities which show considerable change over 
development (Fjell et al., 2012; McRae et al., 2012; Pitskel, Bolling, Kaiser, Crowley, & 
Pelphrey, 2011). The DLPFC is also a part of the brain that is commonly known to mature 
rather late in development (Gogtay et al., 2004; Steinbeis, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2012).  
In sum study 1 aimed to investigate the underlying mechanism of increased emotional 
egocentricity in children and to explore whether emotional egocentricity and cognitive 
egocentricity would be interrelated in child development.  
1. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
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1.5.2 Is there increased emotional egocentricity in Autism Spectrum Disorder? 
While increased cognitive egocentricity in ASD based on deficits in ToM and its underlying 
neuronal network has been frequently reported it remains so far unclear whether excessive 
egocentricity also extend to difficulties in distinguishing self and other perspectives during 
empathy. In other words, whether egocentrism in ASD is as “extreme” as Asperger 
envisioned. Recent research provided initial evidence that there may be functionally distinct 
neural circuits subserving the capacity to overcome cognitive as compared to emotional 
egocentricity (Silani et al., 2013; Steinbeis et al., 2014). These findings corroborate the 
hypothesis that the broader area usually referred to as temporal parietal cortex consists of 
important subdivisions that in turn might subserve different functions in the context of social 
cognition respectively such as self-other distinction during empathic relating on the one hand 
as compared to self-other distinction during ToM. It therefore remains an open question 
whether individuals with ASD show egocentricity across the cognitive as well as the affective 
domains. The aforementioned findings indicate that overcoming emotional egocentricity 
might be independent of overcoming cognitive egocentricity relying crucially on rSMG 
function rather than rTPJ function. This could suggest that individuals with ASD might show 
intact self-other distinction during empathic relating, reflected in an EEB comparable in size 
to healthy controls.  
The first aim of study 2 was to investigate behaviourally whether individuals with 
ASD compared to matched healthy controls would show intact self-other distinction during 
empathic relating, thus normal emotional egocentricity as measured through the EEB Touch-
Paradigm (ETOP, Silani et al., 2013). In addition ToM abilities were investigated with an 
established ToM task, to replicated findings of deficient ToM in ASD.  During the ETOP 
participants are asked to judge the pleasantness of their own tactile experiences or that of 
another person, while both can have congruent or incongruent tactile experiences. The second 
aim of study 2 was to test for differences in the associated brain regions supporting these 
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functions. In order to do so resting-state functional connectivity data seeding from rTPJ, a 
brain region commonly implicated in ToM and rSMG, a brain region implicated in self-other 
distinction during empathy, respectively was analyzed in an independent large multi-center 
sample of individuals with ASD and matched healthy controls. 
In sum in study 2 it was explored whether individuals with ASD relative to healthy 
controls would in the affective domain show normal emotional egocentricity, differentiating 
self and other perspective during empathic relating, associated with intact functioning of the 
rSMG-related brain network. In addition it was hypothesized that individuals with ASD 
relative to healthy controls would exhibit known deficits in ToM possibly based on problems 
differentiating self and other perspectives in the cognitive domain related to aberrant 
functioning of the rTPJ-related brain network.  
 
1.5.3 Egocentric and altercentric biases during empathic relating in Major Depressive 
Disorder and the role of alexithymia 
As mentioned before, findings of empathic deficits in depression have been mixed so far, with 
the greatest consensus on heightened personal distress (Schreiter & Pijnenborg, 2013). This 
lack of clear evidence for empathy deficits in depression may be related to the fact, that 
alexithymia has commonly not been accounted for and that emotional states of self and other 
during empathy tasks have never been varied, mirroring more complex everyday empathic 
relating. Thus, in study 3 we aimed to arrive at a more comprehensive picture of empathic 
relating in depression, elucidating the role of alexithymia while looking at empathic relating 
under simple and complex conditions using the ETOP, manipulating the congruency of 
emotional perspectives of self and other. Findings of deficient emotion regulation abilities 
(Bermpohl et al., 2009; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Kanske, Heissler, Schönfelder, & Wessa, 
2012), heightened processing of negative stimuli (Leppänen, 2006; Sterzer, Hilgenfeldt, 
Freudenberg, Bermpohl, & Adli, 2011) and deficient emotional and non-emotional emotional 
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conflict processing (Etkin & Schatzberg, 2011; Kanske & Kotz, 2012; F. Murphy et al., 1999; 
Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl, & Leplow, 2005; Waring, Etkin, Hallmayer, & O'Hara, 2013) 
could suggest that individuals with depression, even if they possess intact simulation under 
simple empathy conditions, when emotional perspectives between self and other do not differ, 
might show increased egocentric bias under more complex empathy conditions, when needing 
to detach from their own emotional perspective to take the incongruent emotional perspective 
of another person. Emotional judgments of one’s own emotional perspective can however 
also be influenced by another persons’ emotional perspective, leading to an altercentric bias. 
Such an altercentric bias represents a form of emotional contagion, the automatic and implicit 
tendency to resonate and be affected by another person’s emotional perspective (Singer & 
Lamm, 2009). To investigate the altercentric bias during empathic self judgments in 
depression, is of interest as for example heightened personal distress is commonly reported in 
depression (Schreiter & Pijnenborg, 2013), suggesting that individuals with depression might 
also have difficulties detaching emotional perspectives of others from their own, showing 
heightened emotional contagion.  
Alexithymia has been shown to decrease empathic relating based on simulation in 
healthy controls and also in ASD (Bird & Cook, 2013; Bird et al., 2010), and thus will also 
most likely in depression. How alexithymia however affects empathic relating under complex 
conditions in healthy controls as well as in depression remains totally unknown. It could be 
suggested that individuals with alexithymia would experience diminished emotional conflict 
due to diminished emotional awareness, finding it easier to detach from their own emotional 
perspective during empathic relating, leading to a decreased egocentric bias. Emotional 
contagion on the other hand, being a largely unconscious process, might be less affected by 
alexithymia. 
In sum we hypothesized in study 3 that if simulation processes are intact in depression, 
depressed patients might show normal empathic relating under simple conditions, when 
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alexithymia is controlled for. We also expected individuals with depression to have particular 
problems in resolving conflicting emotional perspectives, thus suggesting increased 
egocentric and altercentric biases relative to healthy controls, during empathic relating under 
complex conditions. Alexithymia was hypothesized to influence the size of the egocentric 
bias during empathic relating, as less emotional awareness should decrease the emotional 
conflict between the different perspectives. In contrast, we expected  that alexithymia would 
have less of an influence on the altercentric bias, as emotional contagion should not be 
affected that much by emotional awareness. 
 
 
1.6 Method: Emotional Egocentricity Paradigms 
In all three studies emotional egocentricity in participants was assessed using emotional 
egocentricity paradigms. In study 1 the newly developed EEB Taste-Paradigm (ETAP) based 
on gustatory stimulation was used. In study 2 and 3 emotional egocentricity was assessed with 
the established EEB Touch-Paradigm (ETOP, Silani et al., 2013) based on tactile stimulation. 
In the next part the basic setup and procedure of these emotional egocentricity paradigms will 
be introduced in detail, as they represent the essential methodology that connects all the three 
studies presented in this dissertation. The other tasks which varied across studies will be 
described in detail in each of the manuscript sections (see Chapters 2-4). 
During the emotional egocentricity paradigms participants are seated back to back in 
front of a touch screen unable to see the other person’s face and emotion judgments. This 
means that any influence of the other participant’s actual emotional state can not have any 
influence on ratings, as the emotion judgment is exclusively made through the visual cue of 
what the other was currently experiencing. Before the start of the experiment participants are 
familiarized with the rating scale and perform 10 practice trials for each condition. 
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Participants start with the individual conditions in which they are instructed to either judge the 
pleasantness of their gustatory or tactile experience or judge the pleasantness of the gustatory 
or tactile experience for the other person (blocked design). In the case of the ETAP pleasant 
and unpleasant gustatory stimuli (e.g. juices, bitter solutions) are being presented to the 
participants by a custom-built pump-system specifically designed for this study via several 
small plastic tubes, which merge together at the end into a mouthpiece with small bundled 
tubes (for more detail see Chapter 2). In the case of the ETOP, the participant’s hand is being 
touched by different objects, eliciting pleasant and unpleasant tactile experiences (e.g., silk, 
rubber spider, for more detail see Chapters 3 and 4). In the individual self condition, a picture 
corresponding to the specific tactile or gustatory stimuli (i.e. a picture of a glass of orange 
juice when the participant received orange juice) appears on the screen and remains there until 
the end of the gustatory or tactile stimulation which lasts 1500 ms for the ETAP and 3000 ms 
for the ETOP. In the case of the ETAP the corresponding picture of the gustatory stimuli 
appeared already 500 ms before the stimulation to prepare the participants a little bit in 
advance. Immediately after the end of the stimulation phase participants have to judge the 
experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness of the gustatory or tactile experience by using a 
rating scale (ranging from -10 to +10) on the touch screen, within a 1500 ms response time 
for the ETAP and a 3500 ms and 2000 ms response time for the ETOP in study 1 and study 2. 
In case of the ETAP after the emotion judgment a picture with a water drop appears on the 
screen and water is pumped simultaneously through a tube for a rinse. The rinse lasts for 2000 
ms followed by an instruction to swallow (1000 ms) and a fixation cross (2000 ms). In the 
individual other condition, the trial structure remains the same for the ETAP as well as ETOP, 
but with the important difference that the participant does not receive gustatory or tactile 
stimuli and is instead instructed to judge the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the gustatory 
or tactile experience for the other participant also present in the room based on the picture 
which indicates what gustatory or tactile stimuli the other person receives. Each run consists 
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of 30 pseudo-randomized trials, with 10 pleasant, 10 neutral and 10 unpleasant visuo-
gustatory or visuo-tactile stimuli. 
The individual conditions are followed by the simultaneous conditions (trial example 
for the ETAP, see Figure 1.3).  
 
Figure 1.3. EEB Taste-Paradigm (ETAP) design: Trial structure of the simultaneous other condition. 
 
 
In these simultaneous conditions both participants in the room receive gustatory or tactile 
stimuli simultaneously, and are instructed to either judge the pleasantness of their own or 
tactile gustatory experience (simultaneous self condition) or judge the pleasantness of the 
gustatory or tactile experience for the other person (simultaneous other condition).  The 
simultaneous self and simultaneous other conditions are blocked and counterbalanced. In 
these conditions two pictures appear on the screen. The left picture is labelled “Self” on the 
top and corresponded to the gustatory or tactile stimulation the participant receives, while the 
right picture labelled “Other” corresponds to the gustatory or tactile stimulation the other 
person receives. The gustatory or tactile experiences of the two participants can be either 
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affectively congruent (e.g. both receive positive gustatory or tactile stimuli) or incongruent 
(e.g. one receives positive, the other negative gustatory or tactile stimuli). The EEB is defined 
as the difference between ratings in incongruent and congruent trials when judging the other, 
as compared to the difference when judging one’s own feelings (see Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 
experimental designs of the ETAP and the ETOP).  
 
Figure 1.4. Experimental design of the ETAP with the factors target (self/other judgment), valence 
(pleasant/unpleasant), and congruency (incongruent/congruent). The EEB is calculated as follows: 
EEB = [-1 * (∆s1 - ∆s2) - (∆s3 - ∆s4)] / 2.  
 
 
Figure 1.5. Experimental design of the ETOP with the factors target (self/other judgment), valence 
(pleasant/unpleasant), and congruency (incongruent/congruent). The EEB is calculated as follows: 
EEB = [-1 * (∆s1 - ∆s2) - (∆s3 - ∆s4)] / 2. 
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In the simultaneous conditions for adults each run consists of 40 pseudo-randomized trials, 
with 20 pleasant (10 congruent and 10 incongruent) and 20 unpleasant (10 congruent and 10 
incongruent) visuo-gustatory or visuo-tactile stimuli. Simultaneous conditions are blocked 
according to target, so that half the participants start with the self judgment and half of the 
participants starts with the other judgment. 
 
 
1.7 Summary of the main findings 
1.7.1 Study 1 
Study 1 investigated the underlying mechanism of increased emotional egocentricity in 
children between the ages of 7 to 12 compared to adults, by using the newly designed ETAP 
based on visuo-gustatory stimulation, while also assessing various socio-cognitive and socio-
affective functions. As compared to previous studies using either a visuo-touch (ETOP, Silani 
et al., 2013) or a monetary game paradigm (EMOP, Steinbeis et al., 2014) to induce EEB, the 
use of taste allowed first time to elicit strong enough positive and negative emotions and thus 
a robust EEB in children as well as adults with the same paradigm. As hypothesized, children 
between the ages of 7 to 12 showed a significantly larger EEB compared to adults, which was 
double in size of adults’ and decreased with age. Importantly, only conflict processing and 
none of the other cognitive and affective abilities showed a robust association with individual 
differences in the EEB. Indeed conflict processing was the only one of the many cognitive 
and affective functions assessed that mediated the developmental differences observed in 
EEB between children and adults. This finding suggests that children’s difficulty in 
overcoming emotional egocentricity seem to be best explained by their difficulties in conflict 
processing. Additionally it was found that emotional egocentricity and cognitive egocentricity 
in children were unrelated to each other importantly suggesting that developmental 
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egocentricity might partly represent a domain-specific phenomenon. Chapter 2 will present 
the study outlined above. 
 
1.7.2 Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to investigate first behaviourally whether individuals with ASD compared to 
matched healthy controls would show normal emotional egocentricity as measured through 
the EEB Touch-Paradigm (ETOP, Silani et al., 2013), but exhibit known ToM deficits. The 
second part of study 2 aimed to shed light on the neuronal networks underlying a potential 
dissociation between overcoming cognitive and emotional egocentricity in ASD and their 
respective dysfunction based on a resting-state functional connectivity analysis seeding from 
rTPJ and rSMG respectively in an independent large multi-center sample of individuals with 
ASD and matched healthy controls. 
The results of part 1 of study 2 showed that individuals with ASD, while displaying 
impairments in ToM, exhibited normal emotional egocentricity comparable in size to healthy 
controls. This finding suggests that individuals with ASD have relatively spared self-other 
distinction during empathic relating. Additionally, only ToM abilities were related to 
symptom severity in ASD, while emotional egocentricity as measured by the ETOP, was 
totally unrelated. The results of part 2 of study 2 nicely complimented the behavioural 
findings of part 1. The rSMG, relative to rTPJ, was significantly connected to bilateral AI, 
MCC, i.e., regions which have been consistently shown to play a crucial role in emotion 
processing such as during interoception and empathy (Lamm et al., 2011; Singer, Critchley, & 
Preuschoff, 2009; Singer et al., 2004). The rTPJ, relative to the rSMG, was in contrast 
predominantly connected with PCC, precuneus, MPFC, and lTPJ, all regions commonly 
associated with cognitive processes such as attentional processing, default mode brain 
function, as well as mentalizing and cognitive perspective-taking (Buckner, Andrews‐
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Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Carter & Huettel, 2013; Frith & Frith, 2006; Gusnard, Akbudak, 
Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Van Overwalle, 2009). These differing resting-state profiles of 
rSMG and rTPJ are in accordance with similar parcellations of the temporo-parietal junction 
(Bzdok et al., 2013; Mars et al., 2012). More importantly, the direct comparison of these 
networks between the healthy control and ASD samples revealed that in line with the 
behavioural patterns observed in study 1, ASD participants displayed abnormal resting-state 
connectivity in the ToM network with significantly decreased functional connectivity of the 
rTPJ to the MPFC, PCC and lTPJ. In contrast, there were no significant functional 
connectivity differences between individuals with ASD and healthy controls in the rSMG 
network. Additionally, symptom severity was shown to correlate negatively with increasing 
rTPJ/PCC coupling, speaking to the importance of the ToM network abnormalities in 
contributing to autistic symptomatology.  
In sum, study 2 demonstrated that individuals with ASD show normal emotional 
egocentricity i.e. intact self-other distinction during empathy, which links to an unimpaired 
rSMG network. In contrast ToM abilities in ASD were shown to be deficient and mirrored in 
abberant resting-state connectivity within the rTPJ network. These findings add to a further 
refined characterization of social deficits in ASD, providing novel evidence for spared crucial 
socio-affective abilities. The study summarized here will form Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
 
1.7.3 Study 3 
Study 3 aimed to investigate empathic relating in depression more fully, in further elucidating 
the role of alexithymia, while also looking at empathic relating under simple and complex 
conditions. To do so healthy controls and depressed patients with low and high alexithymia 
performed the ETOP, which allows to vary the congruency of emotional perspectives of self 
and other, thus enables to investigate empathic simulation, as well as self-other distinction 
during empathy. The results showed that as expected alexithymia but not depression 
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decreased empathic relating under the simple condition, suggesting empathic simulation is 
intact in depression when no alexithymia is present. In contrast depressed patients showed 
deficits in empathic relating under the complex condition independently of alexithymia, when 
emotional perspectives of self and other differed. Depressed patients exhibited increased 
egocentric bias during empathic judgments compared to healthy controls under the complex 
condition, suggesting a difficulty in detaching from their own emotional perspective to 
empathically judge the incongruent emotional perspective of another person. Additionally 
depressed patients also showed an increased altercentric bias during emotional self judgments 
compared to healthy controls that was independent of alexithymia. This suggests that a 
heightened emotional contagion in depression towards other people’s emotional perspectives. 
Indeed the degree of emotional contagion as measured by the altercentric bias was positively 
associated with the average length of the episode, seemingly playing a crucial role in 
perpetuating the depressive state. Lastly alexithymia affected only the egocentric bias during 
empathic judgment, in decreasing its size, while emotional contagion was not affected by 
alexithymia. 
 In sum the findings of study 3 suggest that depressed patients show intact empathic 
judgments, when simulation is not hampered by concurrent alexithymia. Under more complex 
conditions however, when emotional perspectives of self and other differ, depressed patients 
show increased egocentric bias during empathic judgments and heightened emotional 
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1.8 Considerations, limitations and perspectives 
The studies presented in this dissertation further advance the knowledge in their respective 
fields. While previous research has investigated the neural correlates of emotional 
egocentricity in adults and children, the underlying mechanism of developmental emotional 
egocentricity had not been identified. Study 1 delivered evidence for conflict processing as an 
underlying mechanism mediating age-related differences in emotional egocentricity. 
Additionally studies 2 and 3 were the first to investigate emotional egocentricity in two 
mental disorders, namely autism and depression which both have been commonly 
characterized by broad social cognitive deficits. The findings of study 2 showed that self-
other distinction during empathic relating as indicated by normal emotional egocentricity, 
remains spared in ASD, based on intact functioning of the rSMG network. This adds to 
previous findings that some important socio-affective abilities are indeed spared in ASD. 
Study 3 showed that MDD patients do show increased egocentric bias during empathic 
relating, independently of alexithymia. Alexithymia and not depression decreased simple 
empathy, but did also decrease the egocentric bias when emotional perspectives of self and 
other differed. Additionally MDD patients displayed an increased altercentric bias during 
emotional self judgments, which represents a form of heightened emotional contagion. These 
findings describe the nature of empathy deficits in depression more fully in suggesting that 
empathic relating is intact in MDD patients, as long as emotional states of self and other are 
congruent and no alexithymia is present, but deficient if emotional states of self and other 
differ and empathic relating becomes more complex. Further research is needed to elucidate 
the underlying mechanisms of these specific deficiencies in empathic relating in depression. 
In the next sections methodical and theoretical considerations that directly follow from 
these 3 studies will be discussed. Afterwards implications for intervention and society will be 
proposed. 
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1.8.1 Methodical Considerations  
The role of conflict processing in relation to developmental emotional egocentricity in 
children needs to be further investigated. As in study 1 just an emotional and not also an 
additional non-emotional Flanker task was used to measure conflict processing, the role of 
solving an emotional conflict in contrast to a non-emotional conflict in relation to emotional 
egocentricity remains to be clarified. FMRI findings have reported different neural correlates 
for emotional and non-emotional conflict processing (Egner et al., 2008; Etkin, Egner, Peraza, 
Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006), possibly suggesting that the role of solving a specifically emotional 
conflict to overcome emotional egocentricity might be of importance. Future studies are 
needed to address this issue.  
As developmental emotional egocentricity has been related to conflict processing 
abilities, it would be viable to assume that conflict processing also plays a role in 
psychopathological emotional egocentricity during empathic relating of MDD patients. In this 
case the same underlying mechanism could explain developmental and psychopathological 
emotional egocentricity. The previous finding of the decreased coupling of DLPFC and rSMG 
in children during overcoming emotional egocentricity (Steinbeis et al., 2014), could refer to 
the deficient ability in resolving the emotional conflict of the emotional perspectives of self 
and other. DLPFC functioning has been associated with conflict processing and particularly 
the resolution of conflict (Badre & Wagner, 2004; Egner et al., 2008), while both has been 
found to be deficient in depression (Grimm et al., 2008; Wolkenstein, Zeiller, Kanske, & 
Plewnia, 2014). Future studies should investigate the role of conflict processing in increased 
egocentric bias during empathic judgments in depression. For future investigations it would 
be of interest to use different attention modulations within the emotional egocentricity 
paradigms to decrease and increase emotional egocentricity. By increasing the saliency of the 
emotional state of the other, the emotional conflict between self and other should be easier to 
overcome, leading to decreased emotional egocentricity.  
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It could be argued that the emotional egocentricity paradigms used do not require 
meta-representations, whereas typical false belief tasks do. The emotional egocentricity 
paradigms are closer to level 1 visual perspective taking tasks, where mental states of both 
self and other might differ, but refer to different objects of reference, thus not necessarily 
needing a conceptualisation of different mental perspectives about the world (Moll & 
Tomasello, 2006). Like level 1 visual perspective taking in which participants are asked ‘what 
they see’, EEB paradigms ask participants ‘what they feel’. It would be interesting therefore 
to let participants make differing emotion judgments on the same object or event of reference, 
asking the question of “how they feel”. This could be for example established in using the 
same symbol, meaning a negative stimuli for one participant and a positive stimuli for the 
other participant. Such an experimental investigation seems of relevance as people often have 
contrary views, beliefs and emotional reactions towards the same object or event in the world. 
For example some people might like the taste of peas, whereas others might totally dislike it. 
Indeed some interesting questions would arise from such a “level 2 emotional egocentricity 
paradigm”. First of all behaviourally it would be interesting whether emotional egocentricity 
as measured with such a “level 2 emotional egocentricity paradigm” would be related to 
emotional egocentricity measured with the established old paradigms (“level 1 emotional 
egocentricity paradigm”). Concerning underlying mechanisms, it could be assumed that 
response inhibition rather than conflict processing might be more related to overcoming such 
an emotional egocentricity, as the particular emotional meaning of the object or event for 
oneself has to be inhibited to really take into account the contrary emotional perspective of 
another person. Importantly as a “level 2 emotional egocentricity paradigm” would make 
more demands on working memory than a “level 1 emotional egocentricity paradigm”, one 
would have to control for this. On the level of the brain it would be interesting whether in 
such a “level 2 emotional egocentricity paradigm” also the rSMG would be recruited or 
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whether the use of possibly meta-representational capacities in the emotional domain would 
recruit rTPJ instead or in addition, as is the case for false belief reasoning. 
 
1.8.2 Theoretical considerations 
Following from the methodological discussion the question of the ecological validity of these 
studies arises. While placing participants in a relevant social context, which already 
establishes a greater ecological validity than in many other social cognition studies, the used 
experimental setups resemble by no means any kind of real life social interaction. The lack of 
ecological validity does however not diminish the applicability of the findings presented. 
However further support of the emotional egocentricity phenomenon and its real-life 
relevance would be achieved by the elucidation of relations to other relevant social 
behaviours, such as prosocial behaviours.  
An important consideration that arises particularly in developmental studies but also in 
psychological studies in general is the debate of motivation versus competence (Benabou & 
Tirole, 2003; Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012; Kanfer & Ackerman, 
1989; Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009; Wigfield & Guthrie, 1997). It has been 
proven difficult to disentangle the two, as most experimental designs do not assess motivation 
in participants. Similarly the used emotional egocentricity designs in our studies do not 
account for motivation. Deficits in executive functions in children for example, such as 
conflict processing, have commonly been interpreted as deficits in competence, which have 
knock-on effects on other cognitions, such as social cognitions. For example the success 
children display on solving implicit ToM tasks before the age of 4 suggest that problems in 
passing explicit ToM tasks, might have to do with competence rather than motivation (Senju, 
2012; Senju et al., 2010). Also children’s difficulty in visual perspective taking has been 
suggested to relate to making an explicit choice and resolve the conflicting perspectives of 
self and other (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004). Similarly the association of conflict 
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processing and increased emotional egocentricity in children in study 1 might point to a 
problem of competence, rather than motivation. Despite these hints, the influence of 
motivation in overcoming emotional egocentricity cannot be ruled out. Similar reasoning 
would apply when interpreting emotional egocentricity in depression. The presence of an 
altercentric bias during emotional self judgments in depression suggests intact spontaneous 
empathic relating in these patients, and instead an inability to detach emotional perspectives 
of other’s from one’s own emotional perspective. Thus, it could be argued that the mechanism 
of solving conflicting perspectives is deficient in depression, which might be less influenced 
by motivational differences, in comparison to mechanisms of empathic relating. However this 
remains purely speculative and only studies that have means of measuring motivation can 
surely talk about its influence and role. 
 
1.8.3 Implications for intervention 
Identifying underlying mechanisms of developmental and psychopathological emotional 
egocentricity can have wide ranging implications for intervention at the level of the 
individual. Abnormal egocentricity can have detrimental effects for an individual in 
integrating into its social environment particularly as there are high interpersonal costs 
involved in not fully comprehending another’s point of view (Newcomb, Bukowski, & Pattee, 
1993; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). This becomes of huge importance for a developing 
child which has to negotiate its place as social self within its environment. Psychopathological 
emotional egocentricity such as in depression prevents individuals from reintegrating into 
his/her social environment, while particularly representing an obstacle for therapeutic success, 
which is largely mediated through a therapeutic alliance build on empathy and trust (Burns & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1992; Lambert & Barley, 2001). With identifying conflict processing as an 
underlying mechanism of increased emotional egocentricity in children, potential 
interventions can be envisioned to tackle abnormal emotional egocentricity early in 
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development. Conflict processing training could help to reduce the conflict experienced by 
children when emotional perspectives of self and other differ, leading to a more accurate 
empathic judgment. As empathy has been linked to pro-sociality (Batson & Shaw, 1991; 
Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Hein, Lamm, Brodbeck, & Singer, 2011; Hein, 
Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010) this would potentially have beneficial effects on 
the prosocial and moral development of children. In a similar manner, once the underlying 
mechanisms of emotional egocentricity in depression are identified, appropriate targeted 
interventions could be designed. Mindfulness-based therapy  which already has been shown 
to reduce depressive symptoms (Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Paul, Stanton, 
Greeson, Smoski, & Wang, 2013), might be also be very useful in reducing abnormal 
emotional egocentricity in children and depressed patients, as it trains executive functions 
(such as conflict processing) as well as interoception (Farb, Segal, & Anderson, 2012; Hölzel 
et al., 2011; Hölzel et al., 2007), which both play a functional role in emotional egocentricity. 
It should be noted that other therapeutic approaches will possibly rely on similar modes of 
action and will most likely be effective for decreasing emotional egocentricity.  
 
1.8.4 Societal relevance 
There have been signs in society that egocentrism is on the rise. Some scholars have for 
example reported that narcissism as an extreme manifestation of egocentrism seems to 
increase among the members of society (Paris, 2014; Twenge, Miller, & Campbell, 2014). 
This unfavorable development could be seen as consequence of a modern society being 
characterized by an “expressive individualism” (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 
1985), violently endorsing the freedom of the individual, and its need for self-fulfillment. 
While more evidence is needed some already speak of a ‘narcissism epidemic’ (Paris, 2014; 
Twenge et al., 2014). It seems thus that if at some point in an individualistic society the only 
thing which can be agreed upon is the freedom of the individual, this society will devour 
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itself. Then egocentricity could indeed become an epidemic in society spreading among its 
members, gnawing at its very foundation, which should be the integral pillars of mutual 
understanding, trust, the means of shared values and the pursuit of shared goals. Investigating 
the causes of emotional and cognitive egocentricity in adults but also in child development 
and psychopathology seems an important scientific endeavour, which could play its part in 
helping to prevent this “egocentric epidemic” from spreading. It comes to no surprise that 
nowadays society could be threatened by divide more than ever. In these fast moving times, 
and a world growing ever more global, humanity seems to shrink to a mass of selves. 
Globalization will pose increasingly more demands for the world community, which will not 
be met, if egocentricity cannot be overcome.  
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This study investigated the cognitive mechanisms underlying age-related differences in 
emotional egocentricity bias (EEB) between children (aged 7-12 years, N = 30) and adults 
(aged 20-30 years, N = 30) using a novel paradigm of visuo-gustatory stimulation to induce 
pleasant and unpleasant emotions. Both children and adults showed an EBB, but that of 
children was larger. The EEB did not correlate with other measures of egocentricity. 
Crucially, the developmental differences in EEB were mediated by age-related changes in 
conflict processing and not visual perspective taking, response inhibition, or processing speed. 
This indicates that different types of egocentricity develop independently of one another and 
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Introduction 
Human interpersonal understanding often relies on mechanisms of self projection and 
simulation (e.g. Mitchell, 2009; Nickerson, 2001; Silani et al., 2013; Van Boven & 
Loewenstein, 2003). These mechanisms however become inefficient as soon one’s own 
mental state or internal experience differs to that of another person. For instance it would be 
erroneous to assume someone was happy while he clearly is sad just because we ourselves 
feel happy. The tendency to project one’s own mental states onto others has been broadly 
termed as egocentricity bias. Early and seminal work in developmental psychology has 
looked at children’s ability in taking visual perspectives of another person, reporting early 
egocentrism in development, one example being Piaget’s famous ‘three mountains’ task, in 
which children at the age of 7 exhibit difficulties judging someone else’s visual perspective 
which differs from their own (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). To date egocentricity bias has thus 
been primarily investigated in visual perspective taking and Theory of Mind (Birch & Bloom, 
2007; Flavell et al., 1981; Pronin, 2008; Royzman et al., 2003; Thomas & Jacoby, 2012). 
Children generally exhibit stronger egocentricity during cognitive perspective taking and 
Theory of Mind tasks than adults. Before the age of 4 children have difficulties attributing 
false beliefs to other people, unable to detach from their own true beliefs (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983). Also, throughout childhood difficulties in cognitive perspective taking and Theory of 
Mind (ToM) seem to persist (Apperly et al., 2011; Keysar et al., 2003; Sommerville et al., 
2013). While strong evidence for egocentricity in the cognitive domain in children as well as 
adults has accumulated over the past decades, very little research focused on investigating 
egocentricity in the affective domain (see O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012; Repacholi & Gopnik, 
1997; Silani et al., 2013; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003) and only one study has so far 
looked specifically at emotional egocentricity in children (Steinbeis et al., 2014). 
Egocentricity is a pervasive phenomenon throughout childhood, spanning moral 
judgments (e.g. Eisenberg et al., 1987), taking the visual perspective of others (e.g. Moll & 
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Tomasello, 2006), and assuming others’ mental states (e.g. Sommerville et al., 2013). 
However, whether egocentricity constitutes a unitary phenomenon in development and 
whether age-related changes in the extent of egocentricity undergo shared developmental 
trajectories remains unclear. Data from meta-analyses and neuroimaging findings in adults 
suggest in part that cognitive egocentricity and emotional egocentricity are dissociable at the 
neural level (Silani et al., 2013). Using visuo-tactile stimulation to induce pleasant and 
unpleasant emotional states in participants (EEB Touch-Paradigm, ETOP), Silani et al. (2013) 
demonstrated that right supramarginal (rSMG) is functionally implicated in overcoming EEB. 
Peaks of this activation were shown to be distinct from other subregions of temporo-parietal 
cortex involved in Theory of Mind and motor egocentricity. However, seeing that cognitive 
capacities and abilities are known to increasingly differentiate with development (e.g. Li et 
al., 2004) it is unclear if these various types of egocentricity correlate in development or not. 
Shedding light on this question is crucial, given the high interpersonal costs associated with 
not fully comprehending another’s point of view (Newcomb et al., 1993; Thompson & 
Loewenstein, 1992). Understanding the mechanisms that underlie the inability to overcome 
such egocentricity early in ontogeny seems an important endeavor as it can provide the basis 
for targeted interventions leading to greater pro-sociality early in development.  
First attempts to uncover the developmental mechanisms that help to overcome EEB 
were recently made in a study (Steinbeis et al., 2014) using monetary reward and punishment 
to induce pleasant and unpleasant emotions in children and adults (EEB Monetary Game 
Paradigm, EMOP). Children (aged 6 to 13) showed a significant EEB, which was 
significantly larger compared to adults. In line with the study by Silani et al. 2013, on the 
neuronal level children showed significantly less activation of rSMG compared to adults 
when having to overcome EEB, as well as reduced coupling between rSMG and left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (lDLPFC). In addition children and adults also performed a 
belief and desire reasoning task, an attentional reorientation task and a Stop-signal reaction 
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time task (SSRT). None of these variables showed a relationship with the EEB in children or 
adults. Thus, while prior work has shown that the EEB is larger in children compared to 
adults and provides a coherent account of the neural mechanisms leading to this 
developmental change, what is still missing and has not been addressed in previous studies, is 
a systematic analysis of the exact cognitive and affective mechanisms that may account for 
observed age-related differences in the size of EEB during development.  
 In order to address this question we developed a novel paradigm, the EEB Taste-
Paradigm (ETAP) using visuo-gustatory stimulation in which participants are asked to judge 
the pleasantness of their own taste experiences or that of another person, while both can have 
congruent or incongruent taste experiences. Pilot work indicated that gustatory stimulation 
elicits equal feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness in children and adults, making it 
highly suited to study developmental differences in EEB as well as extending the 
phenomenon of EEB to another stimulus modality. As in the previous study (Steinbeis et al., 
2014), we expected that children would show an increased EEB compared to adults. 
Overcoming such EEB presumably relies on a multitude of higher- and lower-level cognitive 
and affective processes. With the aim to comprehensively test for these possible processes 
underlying the developmental differences in EEB we assessed them using a large battery of 
tasks. In the following a more detailed description of reasons for investigating particular 
cognitive and affective processes in relation to EEB and developmental differences in EEB 
are given.   
The EEB paradigm involves taking an emotional perspective of the other. In that 
process the role of rSMG seems crucial in overcoming affective egocentricity, which has been 
interpreted as disambiguating emotional self and other perspectives (Silani et al., 2013; 
Steinbeis et al., 2014). As argued previously, it might therefore relate to other types of 
egocentricity. To explore this, we investigated visual perspective taking with a task more 
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closely matched to the EEB paradigm involving incongruent and congruent self and other 
visual perspectives to measure cognitive egocentricity (see Surtees & Apperly, 2012).  
The EEB paradigm also involves the inhibition of one’s own conflicting emotional 
perspective to correctly judge the other person’s emotional state. From the literature in the 
domain of cognitive perspective taking, such as Theory of Mind it is known that inhibitory 
control plays a crucial role, in particular when there is a conflict between self and other 
perspectives (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Friedman & Leslie, 2005; Hansen Lagattuta, Sayfan, & 
Harvey, 2013; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Consequently we included a Go/NoGo task 
measuring response inhibition, moreover, as it is also known that inhibitory control improves 
throughout development (e.g. Luna, Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004; Williams, 
Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999).  
Another executive function which could potentially be an underlying mechanism of 
EEB and the developmental difference in EEB is conflict processing. The ability to resolve a 
conflict has been hypothesized to be a crucial process to overcome the EEB when emotional 
states of self and other are incongruent. It is also known that the ability to resolve conflict 
improves across development (e.g. Fjell et al., 2012), and could therefore account for 
developmental differences in EEB.  
Another high-level cognitive-affective process of interest for this study was cognitive 
reappraisal as a form of emotion regulation (Gross, 2002). The ability to cognitively 
reappraise one’s own emotion and subsequently down-regulate the emotion might be crucial 
in overcoming EEB. Findings additionally suggest that children tend to be less efficient in 
cognitive reappraisal than adults (McRae et al., 2012; Pitskel, Bolling, Kaiser, et al., 2011).  
One key process that the EEB might be explained by is attentional reorienting, 
something which has been consistently associated with the involvement of rSMG  (Carter & 
Huettel, 2013; Mars et al., 2012). So far, no association has been found between measures of 
attentional reorienting and the EEB neither at the neural level nor at the behavioural level 
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(Silani et al., 2013; Steinbeis et al., 2014) and age-related changes in attentional reorienting 
could not account for the observed developmental differences in the EEB (Steinbeis et al., 
2014). Given the differences between the paradigms used to induce the EEB, (primary 
sensory information vs. abstract monetary rewards and punishments in Steinbeis et al., 2014), 
we still included an attentional reorienting task, also with the aim to further the evidence of 
the EEBs independence of attentional reorienting.  
Finally, we also investigated general perceptual speed and its relation to overcoming 
emotional egocentricity in children and adults. Perceptual speed can be seen as a very low 
level-process that could underlie the EEB and its developmental difference between children 
and adults, especially as it has been known that it improves continuously throughout 
development (Kail, 1991; Luna et al., 2004).  
In sum, we comprehensively tested various different cognitive, attentional, socio-
affective abilities, namely visual perspective taking, response inhibition, conflict processing, 
emotion regulation, attentional reorienting and processing speed, with the aim of 
systematically elucidating the exact affective and cognitive mechanisms that underlie age-




Children and adults were invited for three experimental sessions. The first session involved a 
screening, in which the most pleasant, unpleasant and neutral liquids for each participant were 
selected. In the second session children and adults performed the EEB Taste-Paradigm 
(ETAP). In the last session children and adults performed a battery of tests assessing different 
cognitive and affective abilities. The order of the tasks in the last session was counterbalanced 
across subjects. 
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Participants 
Thirty children (15 female; mean age = 9.50; range = 7–12) and adults (15 female; 
mean age = 24.10; range = 20–30) took part in the study. Children and adults were recruited 
from databases at the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences. 
Participants were predominantly White Caucasian. All children were normal developing. All 
participants gave informed consent (parental consent in case of the children) and the study 
was approved by the ethics committees of the University of Leipzig (Nr. 381-11-12122011). 
One child and one adult could not be invited for the third session.  
 
First Session  
Screening. In a screening participants were asked to rate different liquids and 
solutions according to their intensity and pleasantness. Participants were screened for their 
taste sensitivity using a labeled magnitude scale (LMS) (Green et al., 1996), in order to 
exclude possible “super/non-tasters” (e.g. Small et al., 2003). On the LMS scale perceived 
taste intensity ranged from 0 (barely detectable) to 100 (strongest imaginable). Only 
participants in the normal range of tasting for Glucose and quinine/ NaCl solution (1Mol) 
participated in the study. The normal taste range for Glucose was defined as lying between 15 
and 75, for quinine and NaCL solutions between 30 and 75 (see also Jabbi, Swart, & Keysers, 
2007). For each participant the two most pleasant, the two most unpleasant, and the two most 
neutral stimuli were selected and used for the later experiment to guarantee the most effective 
induction of emotions in participants. As pleasant tastes a sugar solution (1 Mol Glucose) and 
three different juices (apple/Samanta, orange/Samanta, grape/albi) were used. For unpleasant 
tastes, three salty solutions (NaCL) of varying concentrations of 0.1, 0.5 and 1 Mol (see e.g. 
O'doherty, Rolls, Francis, Bowtell, & McGlone, 2001) and a quinine solution (0.25mM) were 
used. For neutral tastes, tasteless solutions with the main ionic components of saliva 
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(consisting of 25 mM KCl and 2.5 mM NaHCO 3) were used, diluted with various amounts of 
water (20%, 40%, 60%, 80%). 
Second Session 
Stimuli and apparatus. For the experimental session the different tastes were 
presented with a custom-built pump-system specifically designed for this study via several 
small plastic tubes (diameter = 0.3 cm), which merged together at the end into a mouthpiece 
with small bundled tubes (diameter = 0.1 cm). The mouthpiece was comfortably placed in the 
mouth of the participants with the help of a holder to which the tubes were attached so that 
both hands of the participants were free and able to navigate the touch screen (1920 x 1080 
pixels resolution, 19 inch screen, viewing distance ~ 40 cm). The pump system was operated 
by a Presentation script via a USB connection and was set-up to always pump the same 
amount of liquid in the same time through the tubes (0.5 mil/0.5s).  
EEB Taste-Paradigm (ETAP). The design and procedure of this study was similar to 
a previous study using the EEB Touch Paradigm (ETOP, Silani et al., 2013). Participants of 
the same gender, unknown to each other were assigned pairwise to an experimental session. 
They sat back to back in front of a touch screen unable to see the other person’s face and 
emotion judgments, with the taste tubes comfortably placed in their mouth. This meant that 
any influence of the other participant’s actual emotional state could not have any influence on 
ratings, as the emotion judgment was exclusively made through the visual cue of what the 
other was currently experiencing. Before the start of the experiment participants were 
familiarized with the rating scale and performed 10 practice trials for each condition.  
Participants started with the individual conditions in which they were instructed to either 
judge the pleasantness of their own taste experience or judge the pleasantness of the taste 
experience for the other person (blocked design). In the individual self condition, 500 ms 
before the taste stimulation a picture (size 500 x 400 pixels) corresponding to the specific 
taste (i.e. a picture of a glass of orange juice when the participant received orange juice) 
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appeared on the screen and remained there until the end of the taste stimulation which lasted 
1500 ms. Immediately after the end of the tasting phase participants had to judge the 
experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness of the taste by using a rating scale (ranging from -
10 to +10) on the touch screen, within 1500 ms response time. After the emotion judgment a 
picture with a water drop appeared on the screen and water was pumped simultaneously 
through a tube for a rinse. The rinse lasted for 2000 ms followed by an instruction to swallow 
(1000 ms) and a fixation cross (2000 ms). In the individual other condition, the trial structure 
remained the same, but with the important difference that the participant did not receive any 
taste stimuli and was instead instructed to judge the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the 
taste experience for the other participant also present in the room based on the picture which 
indicated what taste the other person received. Each run for adults consisted of 30 pseudo-
randomized trials, with 10 pleasant, 10 neutral and 10 unpleasant visuo-gustatory stimuli. 
Each run for children consisted of 18 pseudo-randomized trials, with 6 pleasant, 6 neutral and 
6 unpleasant visuo-gustatory stimuli. For the individual conditions this resulted in a three-
factorial mixed design with the two within-group factors target (self, other judgment) and 
valence (pleasant, neutral and unpleasant stimulation) and the between-group factor age 
group (children and adults). 
The individual conditions were followed by the simultaneous conditions. In these 
simultaneous conditions both participants in the room received taste stimuli simultaneously, 
and were instructed to either judge the pleasantness of their own taste experience 
(simultaneous self condition) or judge the pleasantness of the taste experience for the other 
person (simultaneous other condition).  The simultaneous self and simultaneous other 
conditions were blocked and counterbalanced. In these conditions two pictures appeared on 
the screen. The left picture was labelled “Self” on the top and corresponded to the taste the 
participant received, while the right picture labelled “Other” corresponded to the taste the 
other person received. The taste experiences of the two participants could be either affectively 
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congruent (e.g. both receive positive tastes) or incongruent (e.g. one receives positive, the 
other negative taste). The EEB was defined as the difference between ratings in incongruent 
and congruent trials when judging the other, as compared to the difference when judging 
one’s own feelings. Importantly for the simultaneous conditions the self judgment therefore 
was used as a control for general perceptual or cognitive confounds- such as visual and 
affective stimulus comparison, detection of incongruency, or overcoming general response 
conflict. In the simultaneous conditions for adults each run consisted of 40 pseudo-
randomized trials, with 20 pleasant (10 congruent and 10 incongruent) and 20 unpleasant (10 
congruent and 10 incongruent) visuo-gustatory stimuli. For the simultaneous conditions for 
children each run consisted of 24 pseudo-randomized trials, with 12 pleasant (6 congruent and 
6 incongruent) and 12 unpleasant (6 congruent and 6 incongruent) visuo-gustatory stimuli. 
Simultaneous conditions were blocked according to target, so that half the participants started 
with the self judgment and half of the participants started with the other judgment. 
This resulted in a four-factorial mixed design with the three within-group factors 
target (self, other judgment), valence (pleasant, unpleasant stimulation), and congruence 
(congruent, incongruent stimulation of participant and other) and the between-group factor 
age group (children and adults). Data analysis was performed using the IBM SPSS statistics 
software, version 19.0.  
 
Third Session 
Visual perspective taking. To assess children’s and adults’ visual perspective taking 
abilities we used an established paradigm shown to work well for both children and adults 
(for details see Surtees & Apperly, 2012). In this paradigm participants heard instructions 
while they viewed a cartoon avatar standing in a cartoon room with dots on the wall. The 
auditory stimulus asked them to judge how many dots they perceive (self condition) or how 
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many dots the avatar perceives (other condition). The participants then had to respond with 
the appropriate key with “Yes” or “No” (see Surtees & Apperly, 2012). Self trials as well as 
other trials could be either consistent or inconsistent depending on whether both participant 
and avatar saw the same number of dots or not. A possible “egocentric” interference would be 
described as an increase in response time and error rate for participants judgements on 
inconsistent other trials compared to consistent other trials (Surtees & Apperly, 2012). One 
adult participant had to be excluded from analysis, as he clearly misunderstood the task. 
Inhibitory control. Inhibitory control in children and adults was assessed with two 
different Go/NoGo tasks. An emotional Go/NoGo task which used happy and a fearful face 
stimuli as Go and NoGo stimuli (for details see Hare et al., 2008), as well as a normal 
Go/NoGo task (same design) using a blue square as a Go stimuli and a red square as a NoGo 
stimuli (intertrial intervals; 1000 ms, 1500 ms, 2000 ms, 2500 ms, 3000 ms). In these tasks 
participants had to respond quickly with a button-press to the presentation of Go stimuli, 
while withholding a response to the presentation of NoGo stimuli. Response inhibition was 
measured by the ability to inhibit the response to NoGo stimuli. D-primes scores for both 
Go/NoGo tasks were calculated as a measure of response sensitivity (d' = Z(hit rate) - Z(false 
alarm rate)). 
Conflict processing. To assess conflict processing participants performed a Flanker 
task using emotional faces (e.g. Fenske & Eastwood, 2003). Participants had to respond as 
quickly as possible with their right index and middle fingers using the arrow buttons on the 
keyboard to happy and angry target faces (NimStim faces, Tottenham et al., 2009), which 
were presented in the centre of the screen (picture size: 101 X 130 pixels). These target faces 
were flanked by eight distractor faces (picture size: 101 X 130 pixels) which were either all 
identical or opposite in their emotion displayed relative to the target face. The distractor faces 
appeared directly around the target faces in angles of 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°, 225°, 270°, 
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315°, building in total a 3 x 3 grid with the target faces perfectly adjacent directly in the 
centre of the grid. A trial was considered to be compatible if the target face was flanked by 
identical faces portraying the same emotion and considered incompatible if the target was 
flanked by affectively opposite but same identity faces. The eight distractor faces preceded 
the target face (100 ms, 200 ms, or 300 ms), and remained on the screen together with the 
target until a response was given (1000 ms). Trials were always followed by a random 
intertrial interval (500 ms 1000 ms, 1500 ms). In total there were 96 trials, 48 compatible 
trials and 48 incompatible trials (24 happy and 24 angry targets). The trial order was 
randomized for each participant. All participants were instructed to respond as quickly as 
possible. An increase in response time (on correct trials) and error rates in incompatible 
compared to compatible trials indicates a so called flanker compatibility effect (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974). 
Emotion regulation. We specifically developed a new task in which participants were 
instructed to regulate their own taste experiences. To most closely match the demands of the 
emotion regulation task to the demands of the ETAP, the same tastes and the same taste 
pictures were used, as well as the same length of taste stimulation. Participants were 
instructed to either taste the liquids normally or to reappraise their taste experience as weaker 
and less strong (taste or regulate), which was indicated by a picture cue remaining on the 
screen for 4000 ms (see e.g. Pitskel, Bolling, Kaiser, Crowley, & Pelphrey, 2011). This was 
followed by a gustatory stimulation of 1500 ms. Afterwards participants judged the 
pleasantness or unpleasantness of the taste by tapping on a rating scale (ranging from -10 to 
10) on the touch screen, within 4000 ms response time. Afterwards an instruction to relax 
appeared on the screen for 3000 ms, followed by an intertrial interval of 2000 ms. The 
experiment consisted of 10 reappraising trials (5 positive, 5 negative), and 20 normal taste 
trials (5 positive, 5 negative, 10 neutral) in a pseudorandom order. If participants seemed to 
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use other strategies (distraction, suppression) during the training, they were informed about it 
and instructed to use reappraising strategies instead. 
Attentional reorienting. Attentional reorienting was assed using the “attentional 
cueing” paradigm (for details see Mitchell, 2008). In this task participants were instructed to 
indicate by pressing the left or right arrow key on the keyboard, the location of a visual target 
stimulus on the left or the right side of the computer screen. The location of the visual target 
was either congruent or incongruent to a preceding arrow pointing to the left or to the right. 
Typically response times and error rates have been shown to be increased in the incongruent 
condition compared to the congruent condition (Mitchell, 2008). Because of a technical 
problem data from one adult could not be obtained. 
Processing speed. To assess processing speed, children and adults performed a 
reaction time task (for details see Deary, Der, & Ford, 2001). For simple reaction time a grey 
square appeared on the screen and participants had to press the corresponding button (grey 
button) with their index finger. For the four-choice reaction time participants rested the 
second and third finger of each hand on the colored keys (pink, brown, red, blue) and pressed 
the corresponding button when a colored square appeared on the screen.  Because of technical 




EEB Taste-Paradigm (ETAP) 
Individual conditions. 
Ratings. To investigate any group differences in the individual conditions an analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) on the affective ratings with target and valance as within-subjects 
factors, and age group as between-subjects factor was performed. Results revealed no 
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significant main effect of group and no significant interactions of target by group, valence by 
group or target by valence by group (Fs < 1.798, ps > .170). There was a significant main 
effect of valence, F(1, 58) = 429,676, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.881, but no significant main effect of 
target, or significant interaction of target by valence (Fs < 2.836, ps > .098) indicating that the 
emotion induction by means of visuo-gustatory stimulation was equally effective for both 
groups of participants.  
Simultaneous conditions. 
Ratings. To investigate whether children would display a significantly greater EEB 
than adults an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the affective ratings with target, congruency 
and valence as within-subjects factors and age group as between-subjects factor was 
performed. The results showed that there was no main effect of age group, F(1, 58) = 1,442, p 
= .235, p
2 
= 0.024. There were however significant interactions of target and age group, F(1, 
58) = 5,597, p <.05, p
2 
= 0.088 and valence and age group, F(1, 58) = 5,170, p < .05, p
2 
= 
0.082. Most importantly children showed a significantly larger emotional egocentricity than 
adults as shown by the triple interaction of target, congruency and age group, F(1, 58) = 
4,553, p = .037, p
2 
= 0.073. The EEB was defined as the difference between ratings in 
incongruent and congruent trials when judging the other, as compared to the difference when 
judging one’s own feelings and calculated accordingly. In fact, the children’s EEB was 2.09 
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Figure 2.1. EEB (mean + SE) is pooled across pleasant and unpleasant judgments for both children 
and adults. For descriptive purposes, EEB was explicitly calculated by subtracting other-related 
emotion judgments (run “other judgment”) during congruent trials from other-related judgments 
during incongruent trials. From this, as a control, we subtracted the differences between congruent and 
incongruent trials in the “self judgment” run. Whereas both adults and children show a significant 
EEB, children’s EEB is significantly larger and more than double the size of the adults. 
 
 
Further, within the group of children the EEB decreased significantly (one-tailed) with age, r 
= -.335; p = .035, meaning the older children were the smaller their emotional egocentricity 
was.   
The results in the children sample revealed main effects of target, F(1, 29) = 12,727, p 
< .01, p
2 
= 0.305, and congruency, F(1, 29) = 6,103, p < .05, p
2 
= 0.174. There was no main 
effect of valence, F(1, 29) = 0,137, p = .714, p
2 
= 0.005 (Figure 2.2a).  
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Figure 2.2. (a) Children’s emotion judgments (mean + SE) during the simultaneous conditions are 
plotted for each condition of the factorial design. (b) Adults’ emotion judgments (mean + SE) during 
the simultaneous conditions are plotted for each condition of the factorial design.  
 
 
Children displayed significant emotional egocentricity as indicated by the significant target 
and congruency interaction, F(1, 29) = 21,608, p < .0001, p
2 
= 0.427, showing that the 
congruency effect was larger when rating the other compared to rating the self. This observed 
effect in children was 1.2 times larger than in a previous study (p
2 
= 0.427 vs. p
2 
= 0.345 in 
Steinbeis et al., 2014). There were no further significant interactions between the variables 
(Fs < 2.219, ps > .147). The results in the adult sample revealed main effects of valence, F(1, 
29) = 17,646, p < .0001, p
2 
= 0.378, and congruency, F(1, 29) = 5,980, p < .05, p
2 
= 0.171. 
There was no main effect of target, F(1, 29) = 0,206, p = .653, p
2 
= 0.007. Adults displayed 
significant emotional egocentricity as indicated by a significant target and congruency 
interaction, F(1, 29) = 17,346, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.373 (Figure 2.2b). This observed effect in 
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adults was 5.1 times larger than in the in previous study (p
2 
= 0.373 vs. p
2 
= 0.074 in Silani 
et al., 2013), which speaks to the suitability of visuo-gustatory stimulation to induce a strong 
EEB. There were no further interactions between the variables (Fs < 0.580, ps > .453). 
We also tested whether differences in processing speed of emotional incongruence 
between children and adults could influence differences in EEB. For this, we computed an 
EEB from the response times (RTs) of the simultaneous conditions (computed as the EEB for 
the ratings) and used it as a covariate.  The results however showed that the interaction of 
target, congruency and age group remained significant, F(1, 57) = 5,018, p = .029, p
2 
= 
0.081. Similarly, differences in EEB between children and adults could be due to differences 
in emotion intensity perception. We therefore looked at whether the single self intensity rating 
(average of positive and negative ratings for self) has any significant influence on the 
difference in EEB between the two age groups and included it as a covariate. The interaction 
of target, congruency and age group remained significant, F(1, 57) = 3,922, p = .026, p
2 
= 
0.064 (one – tailed). These results show that neither differences in processing speed of 
emotional incongruence nor differences in emotion intensity perception between children and 
adults can explain the larger EEB in children. 
 
Assessment of cognitive and affective mechanisms 
The following describes the results for the tasks performed by children and adults in 
the third session. First, possible age group differences are reported looking at the interactions 
with age group, and then main effects of the tasks for children and adults separately. Second, 
correlations of the different cognitive and affective processes with the EEB are reported first 
for children and adults separately, and then over the total sample.  
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Visual perspective taking. To specifically investigate egocentricity in visual 
perspective taking, analyses were performed on error percentages and responses times for 
other perspective judgments only. 
Error percentages. Looking at age group differences children showed a stronger 
egocentric interference as indicated by a significant consistency by age group interaction, F(1, 
55) = 4,625, p < .05, p
2 
= 0.078. These results suggest that children show an increased 
egocentricity in visual perspective taking compared to adults. For children a significant main 
effect of consistency emerged, F(1, 28) = 19,054, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.405, indicating that 
children showed significant egocentricity during visual perspective taking. Also for adults a 
significant main effect of consistency emerged, F(1, 27) = 15,783, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.369 
indicating that adults showed significant egocentricity during visual perspective taking. 
Response times. Looking at age group differences children showed a stronger 
egocentric interference as indicated by a marginally significant consistency by age group 
interaction, F(1, 55) = 3,970, p = .051, p
2 
= 0.067. For children a significant main effect of 
consistency emerged, F(1, 28) = 56,806, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.670, indicating that children 
showed significant egocentricity during visual perspective taking. Also for adults a significant 
main effect of consistency emerged, F(1, 27) = 71,810, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.727, indicating that 
adults showed significant egocentricity during visual perspective taking. 
Differences in response times and error percentages between inconsistent other and 
consistent other conditions were computed as measures of cognitive egocentricity. In both 
cases larger difference scores indicated greater incongruency costs, therefore greater 
egocentricity. There was no significant relation between cognitive egocentricity and the EEB 
for children (RTs: r = .099, p = .608; error percentage: r = -.145, p = .453) or for adults (RTs: 
r = -.055, p = .780; error percentage: r = -.106, p = .591), or for the total sample (RTs: r = 
.122, p = .368; error percentage: r = -.056, p = .675).  
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Inhibitory control. For the emotional Go/NoGo d-prime score the two different d-
prime scores for the emotional target conditions were averaged together as no significant 
differences were found between response inhibition towards happy and towards fearful 
targets. Larger d-prime scores indicated greater response sensitivity. To investigate 
differences in inhibitory control independent samples t-tests were performed on the d-primes 
measures. Adults showed significantly greater d-prime scores for the emotional Go/NoGo, 
t(56) = 6,414, p < .001, as well as the normal Go/NoGo, t(56) = 10,255, p < .001. These 
results showed that adults exhibited significantly better response inhibition compared to 
children. 
There was no significant relation between response inhibition and the EEB for 
children. This was the case for the emotional Go/NoGo (r = -.207, p = .281) as well as the 
normal Go/NoGo (r =-.113, p = .560). For adults there was also no relation between response 
inhibition on the emotional Go/NoGo (r = -.098, p = .612) and on the normal Go/NoGo (r = 
.030, p = .879) and the EEB. Over the total sample however, there was a significant negative 
correlation of response inhibition and the EEB on the emotional Go/NoGo (r = -.269, p = 
.041) and a marginally significant negative correlation on the normal Go/NoGo task (r = -
.246, p = .063), indicating that with decreasing ability in response inhibition the EEB tends to 
increase.  
Conflict processing.  
Error percentages. Looking at age group differences there was a significant main 
effect of age group, F(1, 56) = 17,339, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.237.  Additionally there was a 
significant interaction of compatibility by age group, F(1, 56) = 4,266, p < .05, p
2 
= 0.071. 
There were no further interactions with age group and target and age group and target and 
compatibility (Fs < 0,091, ps > .764). These results indicate that children show a greater 
compatibility effect than adults pointing towards greater difficulties in conflict processing. 
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For children there was a significant flanker compatibility effect, F(1, 28) = 5,081, p < .05, p
2 
= 0.154 , and no significant main effect of target face or target face by compatibility 
interaction (Fs < 0,692, ps > .412). For adults there was no significant flanker compatibility 
effect, F(1, 28) = 0,032, p = .859, p
2 
= 0.001, and no significant main effect of target face 
and no significant target face by compatibility interaction (Fs < 2,449, ps > .129).  
Response times. Regarding age group differences on response times during correct 
trials there was a significant main effect of age group, F(1, 56) = 15,390, p < .001, p
2 
= 
0.216,  and a marginally significant interaction of compatibility by age group interaction, F(1, 
56) = 3,860, p = .054, p
2 
= 0.064. There were no further interactions with group and target, 
and group and target and compatibility (Fs < 1,479, ps > .229). These results suggest that 
children did indeed show more difficulties in conflict processing, showing greater 
compatibility effects in error percentages and also a tendency towards greater compatibility 
effects in reaction times. For children there was a significant flanker compatibility effect, F(1, 
28) = 26,293, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.484, a significant main effect of target face, F(1, 28) = 7,141, p 
< .05, p
2 
= 0.203 but no significant target face by compatibility interaction, F(1, 28) = 1,838, 
p =.186, p
2 
= 0.062. Children showed significantly faster responses for happy target faces. 
For adults there was a significant flanker compatibility effect, F(1, 28) = 17,634, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.386,  but no main effect of target and no significant target face by compatibility 
interaction (Fs < 3,600, ps > .068).  
A difference in error percentages between incompatible and compatible flanker 
conditions was computed as a measure of conflict processing. A larger difference score 
indicated greater compatibility effects, therefore less efficient conflict processing. There was 
a significant relation between conflict processing and the EEB for children (r = .387, p < .05) 
but not for adults (r = .031, p = .871). Further, there was a significant positive relation 
between conflict processing and the EEB over the total sample (r = .373, p < .005). This 
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significant association between conflict processing and the EEB remained even after 
controlling for response inhibition as measured by the Go/NoGo tasks.  
Emotion regulation. Looking at age group differences there was no significant 
condition by age group interaction, F(1, 56) = 0, 606, p = .404, p
2 
= 0.011, and no further 
significant effects with age group (Fs > 0,398, ps > .531). These results suggest that children 
and adults reappraised their taste experiences equally well in this novel emotion regulation 
task. There was a significant effect of condition for children, F(1, 28) = 57,202, p < .01, p
2 
= 
0.671  as well as for adults, F(1, 28) = 98,454, p < .01, p
2 
= 0.779. There was no significant 
main effect of emotion  (Fs < 1,614 ps > .210) and no significant interaction of emotion by 
condition for children and adults (Fs < 1,047, ps > .315). These results indicate that children 
and adults were successful at reappraising their taste experiences and were so equally well for 
negative and positive tastes.  
A reappraisal score was computed as a measure of emotion regulation success 
(difference between ratings in the taste condition and the regulate condition). Larger scores 
indicated higher reappraisal ability. There was no significant relation between reappraisal 
ability and the EEB for children (r = -.123, p = .529) or for adults (r = .166, p = .389) or for 
the total sample (r = -.023, p = .867). 
Attentional reorienting. Looking at age group differences for error percentages as 
well as response times there was no congruency by age group interaction (Fs < 1,840, ps > 
.181). 
For response times there was a significant main effect of congruency for children, F(1, 
28) = 6,151, p < .05, p
2 
= 0.180 and a marginally significant one for adults, F(1, 27) = 4,059, 
p = .054, p
2 
= 0.131. For both groups no congruency effects were found for error percentages 
(Fs < 1,331, ps > .259).  
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A difference score on the response times was computed as a measure of incongruency 
cost during attentional reorienting (RT incongruent- RT congruent). Larger scores indicated 
greater incongruency cost. There was no significant relation between attentional reorienting 
and the EEB for children (r = -.129, p = .503) or for adults (r = .134, p = .495). There was 
also no relation between attentional reorienting and the EEB over the total sample, r = -.031, 
p = .822. 
Processing speed. Looking at age group differences results revealed a significant 
main effect of age group, F(1, 51) = 13,492, p < .01, p
2 
= 0.213 but no significant condition 
by group interaction, F(1, 51) = 0,185, p = .669, p
2 
= 0.004. There was a significant main 
effect of condition for children, F(1, 23) = 59,025, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.729  and adults, F(1, 28) 
= 637,761, p < .001, p
2 
= 0.958. These results indicated as expected that for the four-choice 
the RTs were significantly larger for children as well adults.  
A reaction time average of the one-choice and the four-choice reaction time task was 
computed and as a general measure of processing speed. There was a significant relation 
between processing speed and EEB for adults (r = .424, p = .022) no such relationship for 
children (r = .104, p = .629) but a significant relation between processing speed and the EEB 
over the total sample, r = .310, p = .024. 
 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
To further investigate which of the cognitive and affective measures uniquely account 
for individual differences in the EEB we performed a stepwise multiple regression over the 
total sample including all cognitive and affective measures. The result indicated that conflict 
processing significantly predicted the EEB crucially explaining a unique variance of the size 
in EEB (F(1, 50) = 6,491, p < .05, adjusted R square = .342). 
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Mediation Analysis 
To investigate whether the observed developmental effects in EEB could be accounted 
for by age-related differences in other cognitive functions we performed a mediation analysis. 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986) three criteria have to be fulfilled  for a mediation 
analysis: 1) the causal variable (in this case age group) has to be related with the outcome (in 
this case the EEB), 2) The causal variable has to correlate with the mediator, 3) the mediator 
has to have a effect on the outcome variable. Having tested 7 additional tasks to investigate 
possible associations between different cognitive functions and the EEB, we first corrected 
for multiple comparisons using a Boneferroni correction. Conflict processing emerged as the 
only other cognitive function that demonstrated robust differences between age groups, as 
well as a significant correlation with the EEB, that survived at the new alpha level of p = 
.0071. We therefore tested whether the observed age effects in the EEB would be mediated by 
differences in conflict processing. To do so, we conducted a mediation analysis where age 
was the predictor, conflict processing (error percentage) the mediator and EEB the outcome 
variable. Analyses were conducted using bootstrapping procedures recommended for smaller 
samples and dichotomous predictor variables (in this case age group) and operationalized in 
an SPSS Macro (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). We used 5,000 bootstrap resamples of the data 
with replacement. Statistical significance with alpha at .05 is indicated by the 95% confidence 
intervals not crossing zero.  
We found a significant mediation effect of conflict processing with respect to the 
relationship between age and the EEB (indirect effect = 1.69, SE = 1.04, 95% confidence 
intervals = .23, 4.16) (see Figure 2.3). In addition this mediation was total, meaning that 
children’s ability to solve conflict accounted solely for the age differences, as the direct effect 
of age did not significantly predict the EEB. 
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Figure 2.3. Display of the mediation model with emotional egocentricity bias as outcome variable, 
age as independent variable, and conflict processing as mediator variable. Values are unstandardized 
regression coefficients, and asterisks indicate significant coefficients (*p < 0.05). There was a 





By using the novel ETAP based on visuo-gustatory stimulation to induce EEB, this study 
investigated developmental differences in the EEB between children and adults and their 
underlying cognitive mechanism. As compared to previous studies using either a visuo-touch 
(ETOP, Silani et al., 2013) or a monetary game paradigm (EMOP, Steinbeis et al., 2014) to 
induce EEB, using taste allowed us for the first time to elicit strong enough positive and 
negative emotions and thus a robust EEB in a children as well as adults with the same 
paradigm. Furthermore, the observed effects in adults as well as children were much larger 
than in  previous studies (Silani et al., 2013; Steinbeis et al., 2014), which speak to the 
suitability of visuo-gustatory stimulation and the new ETAP for the investigation of the EEB. 
As hypothesized, children between the ages of 7 to 12 showed a significantly larger EEB 
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compared to adults, which was double in size. Additionally, in line with previous findings 
(Steinbeis et al., 2014) the EEB decreased within the children sample from age 7 to 12. 
Developmental differences between children and adults were found in processing speed, 
visual perspective taking, inhibitory control and conflict processing but not for attentional 
reorienting and emotion regulation. Importantly, only conflict processing and none of the 
other cognitive and affective abilities showed a robust association with individual differences 
in the EEB. Indeed conflict processing was the only of the many cognitive and affective 
functions assessed that mediated the developmental differences observed in EEB between 
children and adults. This suggests that children’s difficulty in overcoming the EEB seem to be 
best explained by their difficulties in conflict processing.  
While conflicting information is both present, in the incongruent other as well as in 
the incongruent self condition of the ETAP, the response conflict is much larger when one has 
to take the perspective of another person which is incongruent to one’s own than if you have 
to rate your own states even if these are incongruent to what the other is feeling. In the 
incongruent other condition the immediate emotional experience of the self seems to be more 
difficult to disregard than the more abstract notion of the other’s emotional state conveyed by 
the picture in the incongruent self condition. Children’s difficulties in conflict processing 
have been previously reported and it is assumed that conflict processing relevant brain regions 
such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and DLPFC develop throughout 
childhood into early adulthood (e.g. Fjell et al., 2012; Steinbeis et al., 2012). Though we have 
no direct evidence we propose that it is in particular the process of conflict resolution that 
plays a functional and critical role in overcoming emotional egocentricity. In support of this 
claim, the DLPFC in particular has been interpreted to play an important role in the resolution 
of conflict (Badre & Wagner, 2004; Chen, Wei, & Zhou, 2006; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Kim, 
Kroger, & Kim, 2011), while also showing protracted maturation (Gogtay et al., 2004; Shaw 
et al., 2008; Sowell et al., 2003). Consequently the previously mentioned crucial involvement 
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of lDLPLC in overcoming EEB (Steinbeis et al., 2014), might be related to the underlying 
mechanism of conflict processing (resolution of conflict in particular), as identified in this 
study. It might be therefore suggested that lDLPFC communicates with rSMG, which 
disambiguates emotional self and other perspectives, and engages in conflict resolution to 
overcome emotional egocentricity bias to arrive at an accurate empathic judgment of the 
others’ emotional state. Ongoing maturational processes in both, the lDLPFC and rSMG as 
well as their neuronal connections seem to make children more prone to an increased EEB 
compared to adults. It has to be noted that even though there is already some strong evidence 
to assume that a similar set of brain regions is recruited in the context of overcoming the EEB, 
whether this also holds for the present paradigm remains to be seen. Taken together, in 
ascribing the specific functional role of conflict resolution to lDLPFC in overcoming EEB, 
this study not only provides an underlying mechanism explaining age-related differences in 
EEB but also relates is to a specific neuronal architecture meaningfully tying together 
behavioural and neuroimaging findings. Even further, as empathic abilities have been linked 
to pro-social behaviours (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Hein 
et al., 2011; Hein et al., 2010), the identification of conflict processing as an underlying 
mechanism of developmental differences in EEB, could possibly inform targeted 
interventions leading to greater pro-sociality early in development by increasing the accuracy 
of empathic judgments in children.  
In identifying conflict processing as an underlying mechanism of developmental 
differences in EEB, the question arises to what degree it is in particular children’s ability to 
resolve an emotional conflict as compared to a non-emotional conflict during the ETOP. The 
conflict processing task in this study used emotional stimuli, so it can be argued that this task 
not only measures conflict processing per se but even beyond that measures emotional 
conflict processing. Previous research has shown that solving emotional conflicts versus non-
emotional conflicts recruits very specific brain regions (Egner et al., 2008; Etkin et al., 2006). 
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In the case of this study the emotional Go/NoGo task and non-emotional Go/NoGo task, 
while equivalent in design, did not correlate very highly (r = .557, p < .001) over the total 
sample, indicating that the affective aspects of the task are not totally accounted for by a 
general cognitive process. In sum, it can be argued that for children it might potentially be in 
particular their ability to resolve emotional conflicts that helps them to decrease their 
emotional egocentricity, however further research is needed too clarify this point, using 
emotional and non-emotional conflict processing tasks. In this study no significant 
compatibility effect was found for error rates in adults on the Flanker task. One plausible 
explanation could be a ceiling effect in performance, as adults are very good at resolving 
conflict, as also the low error rates for adults during incongruent trials in this study suggest. 
Another important question of this study was whether egocentricity constitutes a 
unitary phenomenon in development and whether age-related changes in the extent of 
egocentricity undergo shared developmental trajectories. Interestingly, this study did not find 
any evidence for a relation between the EEB and visual perspective taking. Similarly to 
Theory of Mind, visual perspective taking has been associated with functioning of the rTPJ 
and not the rSMG (e.g. Ramsey et al., 2013). Visual perspective taking was investigated using 
a previously established paradigm (Surtees & Apperly, 2012) in order to search for possible 
commonalities with the EEB. Visual perspective taking, especially level-2 perspective taking 
has been found to be related to Theory of Mind (e.g. A. F. d. C. Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 
2009) and as this paradigm also included a conflicting self and other perspectives it was very 
similar in demands to the ETAP and therefore a good comparison task. While developmental 
differences in visual perspective taking were indeed observed, with children committing more 
egocentric errors and showing higher incongruency-costs in reaction times as adults, these 
age-related differences were however unrelated to individual differences in the size of the 
EEB.  This means that, for example, children showing egocentricity in visual perspective 
taking did not necessarily show such egocentricity in emotional perspective taking. This 
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finding together with the previous above mentioned findings (Silani et al., 2013; Steinbeis et 
al., 2014) supports the view that overcoming egocentricity in the emotional domain has to be 
seen as a different function than overcoming cognitive egocentricity involved in visual 
perspective taking and Theory of Mind tasks. This in turn suggests that egocentricity cannot 
be regarded as a unitary phenomenon in development, and future research should instead treat 
egocentricity as a phenomenon with considerable domain specificity. 
Previous studies have suggested that the ability to overcome EEB is associated with 
brain functions of the rSMG (Silani et al., 2013; Steinbeis et al., 2014) and may be unrelated 
to abilities of attentional reorienting and Theory of Mind, both of which have been associated 
to functions of the adjacent rTPJ (Decety & Lamm, 2007; Mitchell, 2008; Scholz, 
Triantafyllou, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Brown, & Saxe, 2009). The present results are again a piece 
of evidence for such a functional segregation as again here the EEB was not related to 
attentional reorienting neither in children nor in adults. This suggests that the lower-level 
processes such as attentional reorienting, as well as processing speed are not crucially 
involved in overcoming emotional egocentricity, and do not explain any developmental 
differences in EEB.  
Whereas conflict processing explained developmental differences in EEB, response 
inhibition as measured by the emotional and normal Go/NoGo task did not. This fact might be 
best explained by the nature of the EEB task. In contrast to false belief tasks and level 2 visual 
perspective taking tasks, which have been related to inhibitory control (Carlson & Moses, 
2001; Friedman & Leslie, 2005; Perner & Lang, 1999; Wellman et al., 2001), mental states of 
self and other are not competing experiences, having the same object of reference but merely 
conflicting emotional experiences with differing objects of reference. So for example in a 
typical false belief task the two agents have different knowledge about where an object is 
hidden, while one agent’s belief is necessarily true, the other agent’s belief is necessarily 
false. In the EEB task in contrast the two agents have differing emotional experiences, each 
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linked to a separate object of reference (e.g. juice vs quinine). While these emotional 
experiences are conflicting they are not competing realities as they remain true in their own 
right, bound to the individual experiences. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that response 
inhibition might be less involved in overcoming emotional egocentricity, as the emotional 
state of the self has to be disregarded rather than inhibited to arrive at a correct empathic 
judgment of the emotional state of the other. This would mean that conflicting emotional self 
and other representations are both online, but self representations do not have to be totally 
detached from to take the perspective of the other as in the case of false belief tasks. It might 
be specifically the ability selectively attend to one stimuli while ignoring the conflicting one 
which is presented simultaneously that distinguishes conflict processing from simple response 
inhibition, and relates conflict processing to overcoming emotional egocentricity during the 
ETOP. Additionally the blocked design used in this study minimized doubt about what the 
prepotent response should be (rating self or rating the other), therefore diminishing a further 
need for response inhibition. For future studies it would be interesting whether response 
inhibition would become increasingly involved, when using the ETOP with an even-related 
design.   
Another cognitive capacity that has been hypothesized to potentially play a role in 
overcoming EEB and the developmental differences in EEB between children and adults, is 
emotion-regulation through cognitive reappraisal. To investigate children’s and adults 
abilities to regulate their emotional states through cognitive reappraisal we developed an 
emotion regulation paradigm in which participants were instructed to regulate their taste 
experiences. This was done to closely match the emotion regulation task to the taste EEB 
task. Both children and adults were able to reappraise their taste experiences, and unlike our 
expectations and previous findings (e.g. McRae et al., 2012; Pitskel, Bolling, Kaiser, et al., 
2011), no developmental differences in cognitive reappraisal emerged based on this task. It is 
unclear why no developmental differences were found. Albeit speculative it could be the case 
2. Manuscript of Study 1 
61 
that primary emotions are somehow easier to regulate than more complex secondary 
emotions. The significant association of conflict processing and age-related differences in the 
EEB might suggest that more basic and possibly more rapid cognitive processes might be 
involved in overcoming the EEB with its short time scale, leaving little room for more explicit 
and complex cognitive processes such as cognitive reappraisal. 
Conclusion 
Using a novel EEB paradigm based on visuo-gustatory stimulation, the ETAP, this 
study extends previous findings of the existence of an EEB in children and adults to another 
modality. Children between the ages of 7 to 12 exhibited a significantly larger EEB than 
adults. There was no evident link in the development of overcoming the EEB with 
developmental changes in cognitive egocentricity, speaking to egocentricity as a partly 
domain-specific phenomenon. In turn, the age-differences were mediated by conflict 
processing ability but not by a variety of other possibly relevant affective and cognitive 
abilities such as inhibition, attentional reorienting, processing speed or emotion regulation. 
Thus, the ability to process conflict seems to be crucial in overcoming emotional egocentricity 
bias and future research should aim to look more closely in what ways conflict processing and 
the EEB are interrelated on the behavioural and the neuronal level. Additionally, this study 
provided further evidence for the assumption that overcoming emotional egocentricity is 
independent of other functions also relying on temporo-parietal functions such as attentional 
reorienting, Theory of Mind and visual perspective taking. The further investigation of the 
EEB in development and its interrelation with the development of conflict processing in 
general seems of great significance, as inappropriate and egocentrically biased empathic 
judgments can hamper the normal development of interpersonal understanding, be the cause 
of conflicts and could lead to detrimental consequences for developing children trying to find 
their place in their social world. In this sense identifying underlying mechanisms of emotional 
egocentricity in development, such as conflict processing, can help to inform interventions 
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Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) shows known deficits in self-other distinction during 
Theory of Mind (ToM). Whether self-other distinction during empathy is deficient in ASD 
remains unknown. 
Aims 
To investigate whether ASD patients show difficulties in emotional self-other distinction as 
mirrored in increased emotional egocentricity and if potential deficits are linked to 
dysfunctional resting-state connectivity patterns.  
Methods 
In a first study, ASD patients and matched controls performed an emotional egocentricity 
paradigm and a ToM task. In the second study, resting-state connectivity of right temporo-
parietal junction (rTPJ) and right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) were analysed using a large-
scale fMRI data set. 
Results 
ASD patients exhibited deficient ToM but normal emotional egocentricity, which was 
paralleled by reduced connectivity of regions of the ToM network and unimpaired rSMG 
network connectivity. 
Conclusions 
Results suggest normal emotional egocentricity and intact rSMG network in ASD, indicating 
spared self-other distinction during empathy in patients stigmatized to suffer from broad 
social deficits. 
Declaration of interest 
None. 
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Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a common, early-onset neurodevelopmental disorder 
characterized by impairments in social communication, interaction, and stereotyped or 
repetitive behaviours and interests (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Already in his 
original paper, Asperger (1944) described the children he studied as being “egocentric to the 
extreme”. Consequently, one of the most consistently reported social cognition deficits in 
ASD has been in Theory of Mind (ToM) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Castelli et al., 2002; Frith 
& Frith, 2012; Happé, 1994) the socio-cognitive ability to understand the mental states of 
others, such as beliefs and intentions (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). When engaging in ToM 
tasks, higher egocentrism of individuals with ASD compared to non-autistic individuals is for 
example evidenced by their increased difficulty in passing false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985; Begeer et al., 2012; Senju et al., 2010; Senju et al., 2009).  
It has been proposed that the underlying problem in ToM and in particular false belief 
understanding for individuals with ASD is difficulties in differentiating between perspectives 
of self and other, also known as self-other distinction (Lombardo & Baron-Cohen, 2011). 
Human interpersonal understanding often relies on mechanisms of self-projection and 
simulation (Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009; Brass et al., 2009; Decety & Lamm, 2007; 
Gallese, 2001, 2007; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Mitchell, 2009; Nickerson, 2001; Silani et 
al., 2013; Singer, 2012; Singer et al., 2004; Steinbeis et al., 2014; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 
2003). However, such projection mechanisms fail in making sense of other’s mental states in 
situations where mental states of self and other clearly differ, such as in typical false belief 
tasks, eventually leading to egocentrically biased judgments (Birch & Bloom, 2007; Pronin, 
2008; Royzman et al., 2003). To avoid egocentrically biased judgments, a mechanism 
differentiating between self and other perspectives has to be in place. In sum, context 
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appropriate differentiation of self and other might be at the core of many social cognition 
deficits displayed in ASD. 
While self-other distinction during ToM seems to be crucial, recent evidence has 
shown that self-other distinction is of equal importance during empathic relating (Silani et al., 
2013; Steinbeis et al., 2014). Empathy involves sharing the emotional state of others while 
being aware that the other is the source of that state (Singer & Lamm, 2009), requiring 
emotional self-other distinction particularly in cases, where emotional states of self and other 
are incongruent. Failure of self-other distinction during empathy results in egocentric 
emotional responses, e.g. failure to share sadness of a friend when being in a good mood. 
While deficits in ToM in ASD have been consistently reported, it remains less clear whether 
individuals with ASD also have difficulties in empathy, particularly when emotional states 
between oneself and others might differ in valence. There is indeed good evidence that 
empathy may be intact in ASD (Hadjikhani et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2010; Lockwood et al., 
2013; Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 2007). While some studies have 
reported lower empathy in ASD (Bird et al., 2010; Dapretto et al., 2005; Minio-Paluello, 
Baron-Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009), there is increasing evidence that such 
deficits might arise more from comorbid alexithymia, i.e. inability to identify and describe 
one's own emotions, as opposed to autism-specific deficits per se  (Bird & Cook, 2013). As 
empathy might thus be intact in ASD, it is still an open question if, in case of incongruent 
emotional states, individuals with ASD would display increased emotional egocentricity, 
indicating poor self-other distinction also in the affective domain. Our main aim was therefore 
to test for increased emotional egocentricity bias (EEB) in ASD compared to normal controls. 
In this study we used the EEB Touch-Paradigm (ETOP) (Silani et al., 2013), in which 
emotions are induced via tactile stimulation. The ETOP allows to measure pure empathic 
relating under different conditions, when emotional states of self and other are congruent or 
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incongruent, thus assessing empathic simulation, but also self-other distinction during 
empathy.   
A key brain region adequately suited for self-other distinction in the cognitive domain, 
being a hub of both interoceptive and exteroceptive information pathways is the so-called 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). TPJ has shown to be consistently recruited during ToM 
(Aichhorn et al., 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Ramsey et al., 2013; Sommer et al., 2007). In 
particular the right TPJ, has been suggested to play a major role during ToM, especially when 
self-other distinction is required (Aichhorn et al., 2006; Sommer et al., 2007). It has however 
been suggested that rTPJ plays a more general role in self-other distinction in the cognitive as 
well as motor domain, based on results from meta analyses and single studies, showing a 
relation between the inhibition of spontaneous imitation tendencies (i.e. self-other distinction 
in the motor domain) and ToM abilities (Santiesteban, White, et al., 2012; Spengler et al., 
2009, 2010). A recent study using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of rTPJ 
provided strong evidence that rTPJ is causally involved in differentiating self and other during 
imitation inhibition and ToM (Santiesteban, Banissy, et al., 2012). Thus rTPJ might help to 
differentiate self and other perspectives during ToM but also in the motor domain. In the case 
of ASD, structural and functional abnormalities of rTPJ have been linked to social cognition 
deficits. Conversely, recent research that self-other distinction in the emotional domain may 
be subserved by brain regions part of temporo-parietal cortex, but slightly more anterior to 
TPJ, namely the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG). Thus, a study by Silani et al. (2013) 
demonstrated that adults show an emotional egocentricity bias (EEB) when judging the 
emotional state of another person incongruent to their own, while the right supramarginal 
gyrus (rSMG) was functionally implicated in overcoming EEB. Peaks of this activation were 
distinct from other subregions of temporo-parietal cortex involved in ToM. In line with these 
findings, a study by Steinbeis et al. (2014) showed that children displayed increased 
emotional egocentricity compared to adults related to reduced activation of rSMG. In a 
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complementary resting-state connectivity analysis, rSMG showed stronger functional 
connectivity to regions of the empathy network, such as the middle cingulate cortex, bilateral 
anterior insulae (AI), extending to inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and bilateral dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), while rTPJ showed stronger functional connectivity to nodes of 
the ToM network, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the precuneus. Taken 
together these findings corroborate the hypothesis that the broader area usually referred to as 
temporal parietal cortex consists of important subdivisions that in turn might subserve 
different functions in the context of social cognition respectively such as self-other distinction 
during empathy on the one hand as compared to ToM on the other. A second aim of the 
present study was to test for differences in the associated brain regions supporting the 
function of overcoming emotional egocentricity on the one hand and ToM on the other hand. 
In order to do so we analyzed resting-state functional connectivity data in an independent 
large multi-center sample of individuals with ASD and matched healthy controls, seeding 
from rSMG, a region directly implicated in overcoming emotional egocentricity and rTPJ, a 
region commonly shown to play a crucial role during ToM. 
To sum up we aimed to investigate whether individuals with ASD relative to healthy 
controls would show normal emotional egocentricity, differentiating self and other 
perspective during empathic relating, associated with intact functioning of the rSMG-related 
brain network. In contrast we hypothesized that individuals with ASD relative to healthy 
controls would exhibit known deficits in ToM possibly linked to problems differentiating self 
and other perspectives in the cognitive domain related to aberrant functioning of the rTPJ-









Behavioural sample. For Study 1, 32 adults with ASD and 26 healthy controls were 
recruited. In the case of the ASD patients 4 participants showed abnormal emotional 
responses to the stimuli (e.g. rated positive stimuli as negative and vice versa) and were 
excluded from further analysis. 3 ASD patients and 1 healthy control participants were later 
excluded, showing abnormal emotional egocentricity, with ratings above two standard 
deviations. Subsequently the final sample included 25 adults with ASD and 25 IQ and gender-
matched neurotypical participants (see Table 3.1). ASD participants were recruited through 
the outpatient clinic of the Charité University Medicine Berlin, or were referred to us by 
specialized clinicians. Diagnoses according to DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) for Asperger disorder and autistic disorder without intellectual disabilities 
were based on expert clinical opinion and the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, 
ADOS (Lord et al., 2000), and the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R), if parental 
information was available (n = 14). ADOS - scores are used as a measure for symptom 
severity throughout this article. Healthy control (HC) participants with no history of 
psychiatric or neurological disorders were recruited by public notices and from project 
databases of the Freie Universität Berlin and the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive 
and Brain Sciences Leipzig, Germany. Crystalline and fluid intelligence levels were estimated 
by means of a verbal intelligence (German vocabulary test / Mehrfach-Wortschatz-Test 
(MWT), Lehrl, Triebig, & Fischer, 1995) and a strategic thinking test (LPS, subscale 4, Horn, 
1962) respectively, and combined to yield a full scale IQ (FIQ). Autistic traits and 
Alexithymia were assessed in both groups using the Autism Quotient and the Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale (TAS-26, Taylor, Ryan, & Bagby, 1985), respectively. Participants gave 
informed consent prior to participation and received payment. The study was approved by the 
ethics committee of the German Society for Psychology (DGPs). 
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Table 3.1. Demographic characteristics and diagnosis of the behavioural sample (Study 1) 



























p = .960 
p = .246 
p < .001*** 
p < .001*** 
Statistics applied: independent t-test. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
 
Imaging sample. For Study 2, we studied a subsample of 163 (84 ASDs, 79 healthy 
controls) male participants from the Autism Brain Imaging Data Exchange (ABIDE) 
database, a publically available multi-center aggregate of previously collected structural and 
functional MRI data from individuals with ASD and healthy controls (see 
http://fcon_1000.projects.nitric.org/indi/abide and Supplement 1). ASD diagnosis according 
to DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) were based on expert clinical 
opinion and the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, ADOS (n = 63) (Lord et al., 2000), 
and/or the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised, ADI-R (n = 27) (Lord, Rutter, & Le 
Couteur, 1994). Note that for the individuals of the behavioural sample no resting-state scans 
were available. To further inform the behavioural results, however, we chose to analyze 
resting-state data from the ABIDE database. The selected sample (see Table 3.2, see also 
supplemental material) was chosen to be within the same age range as the behavioural sample 
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(20-55 years), and ASD participants of both samples did not differ in terms of symptom 
severity as measured through the ADOS. Within the imaging sample, individuals with ASD 
only differed in terms of full scale IQ to the healthy controls. Subsequently, full scale IQ was 
used as a covariate of no interest in the resting-state analysis. 
 
 
Table 3.2. Demographic characteristics and diagnosis of the fMRI sample (Study 2) 





















p = .956 
p = .001** 
Statistics applied: independent t-test. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
 
EEB Touch-Paradigm (ETOP) 
The design and procedure of this paradigm was identical to that reported in Silani et al. 
(2013) and is described in further detail in Supplement 1. Participants were invited pairwise to 
an experimental session and while sitting back-to-back were asked to rate on a touch screen 
the pleasantness or unpleasantness of tactile stimulation of their left palm. In the crucial 
simultaneous conditions of this task, both participants received tactile stimulation 
simultaneously, and were instructed to either judge the pleasantness of their own tactile 
experience (simultaneous self condition) or judge the pleasantness of the tactile experience for 
the other person (simultaneous other condition). In these conditions two pictures appeared on 
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the screen, while the left picture with the label “Self” corresponded to the tactile stimulation 
the participant received (e.g. a picture of a rose while the participant was touched by a silky 
object), the right picture with the label “Other” corresponded to the touch the other person 
received. The touch experiences of the two participants could be either affectively congruent 
(e.g. both touched by pleasant materials, e.g. silk and fur) or incongruent (e.g. one gets 
touched by a pleasant, the other by an unpleasant material, e.g. silk and rubber spider). 
Immediately after the stimulation phase (3000 ms) participants judged the pleasantness or 
unpleasantness of the tactile experience using a rating scale ranging from -10 to 10 on the 
touch screen within 3000 ms response time. The EEB was defined as the difference between 
ratings in incongruent and congruent trials when judging the other, as compared to the 
difference when judging one’s own feelings.  
To assess whether emotion induction worked for both groups, each session started 
with individual conditions, in which participants received tactile stimulation one-by-one 
instructed to either judge the pleasantness of their own touch stimulation or the pleasantness 
of the tactile stimulation for the other person based on the picture indicating what tactile 
stimulation the other participant received (see Supplement 1).  
 
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) 
During the MASC participants are watching a 15 min movie about four characters 
spending an evening together, which is stopped 45 times for questions about the actors' 
mental states. Correct responses were computed to a total score. The MASC has proven 
internal consistency, sensitivity, stability over time (Dziobek et al., 2006) and has been used 
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Resting-state connectivity analysis 
Data were processed using the data processing assistant for the resting-state fMRI 
toolbox (DPARSF, Song et al., 2011) for Matlab. The toolbox is based on the Statistical 
Parametric Mapping toolbox (SPM8, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing 
followed a standard procedure, including a scrubbing approach  and a band-filter within  the 
0.01 and 0.08 Hz band (Satterthwaite et al., 2013) , to deal more thoroughly with motion 
artifacts. Images underwent DARTEL-based segmentation and registration, followed by 
nuisance covariate regression to remove effects of average WM and CSF signal, as well as 6 
motion parameters (For further details of the data preprocessing and connectivity analyses 
please refer to Supplement 1). In the resting-state sample, 6/84 individuals with ASD and 2/79 
of healthy controls showed head-motion beyond 3mm translation or 3 degrees of rotation and 
were excluded from all further analysis. Functional connectivity maps were generated for 
both rSMG and rTPJ, based on the overlap of activations from two separate fMRI 
experiments using the ETOP (MNIxyz = 65, -37, 33)  and a coordinate-based meta-analysis of 
rTPJ-activation in ToM studies by Mar (2011) respectively (MNIxyz = 51, -52, 21). Results of 
this analysis were provided as a NIfTI File thresholded at p = 0.01, FDR-corrected. Both 
regions the rSMG and rTPJ region were adjacent to each other but spatially non-overlapping 
(Figure 3.1). Group differences in functional connectivity were analyzed with SPM8 using 
random-effects models, assessing interactions between within-subject difference of rTPJ to 
rSMG connectivity and the group. For ASD patients whole-brain correlations were run using 
the ADOS social score, as a measure of symptom severity. The number of sites, age and FIQ 
were included in the model as covariates of no interest. Using Monte Carlo simulation 
correcting for multiple comparison cluster size corrected results are reported (voxel-wise p 
value of .01 combined with an extent threshold of 77 voxels corresponded to cluster-wise 
family-wise error rate of .05).  
 




Figure 3.1. Display of adjacent but non-overlapping rSMG and rTPJ regions used for functional 
connectivity analysis in a large independent sample of individuals with ASD and healthy controls. The 
rSMG region consists of an overlap of activations of two fMRI experiments (MNIxyz = 65, -37, 33) 
looking at the neuronal basis of the EEB using the ETOP (Silani et al., 2013). The rTPJ region 




EEB Touch-Paradigm (ETOP) 
Simultaneous conditions. To investigate whether ASD participants and healthy 
controls display different emotional egocentricity an ANOVA on the affective ratings with 
target, congruency and valence as within-subjects factors and group as between-subjects 
factor was performed. 
The results showed significant main effects of target (F1, 48 = 11.14, p = .002, p
2 
= 
.188), valence (F1, 48 = 16.92, p < .001, p
2 
= .261), and group (F1, 48 = 6.10, p = .013, p
2 
= 
.113), and significant interactions of target and valence (F1, 48 = 9.57, p = .003, p
2 
= .166), 
and congruency, valence and group (F1, 48 = 4.70, p = .035, p
2 
= .089). Importantly however, 
while there was a significant target by congruency interaction (F1, 48 = 10.58, p = .002, p
2 
= 
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.181), there was no significant interaction of target, congruency and group, suggesting no 
group difference in emotional egocentricity (F1, 48 = 0.17, p = .684, p
2 
= .003). Both ASD 
participants and healthy controls however showed a significant EEB (F1, 24 = 5.56, p = .027, 
p
2 
= .188; F1, 24 = 5.27, p = .031, p
2 
= .180). Including the TAS score as a covariate in the 
model revealed no significant interaction of target, congruency and group (F1, 48 = 0.02, p = 
.882, p
2 
= .00047), ruling out that any possible differences in EEB between healthy controls 
and ASD participants was being masked by alexithymia in the ASD group. In fact, the EEB of 
ASD participants and healthy controls was comparable in size (t48 = 0.41, p = .684, 95% CI = 
-.40 <= μ1 - μ2 <= .60, d = .11, 95% CI = -0.44 <= ∆ => 0.67) (ASD = 0.35, Healthy contols 
= 0.45, Figure 3.2A). The EBB in ASD participants was unrelated to symptom severity (r = -




Figure 3.2. (A) Display of the Emotional Egocentricity Bias (EEB). Both groups displayed a 
significant EEB but the size of the EEB was similar for individuals with ASD and healthy controls, 
suggesting intact self-other distinction during empathic relating in ASD. (B) MASC Total Score. As 
expected healthy controls showed a significantly greater MASC score than individuals with ASD, 
suggesting deficient ToM in ASD.  
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Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) 
ASD participants showed significantly lower scores on the MASC (t46 = 2.32, p = 
.025; Figure 3.2B) Scores on the MASC were negatively related to symptom severity as 
measured by the ADOS (r = -.69, p = .001). Additionally the MASC score were unrelated to 
the EEB for ASD patients (r = .10, p = .648) and healthy controls (r = -.08, p = .712). 
 
Resting-state connectivity analysis 
We directly compared the voxel-wise connectivity strength of both regions within 
subjects combining individuals with ASD and healthy controls. The rSMG showed marked 
connectivity patterns relative to rTPJ to the lSMG, the bilateral AI extending into IFG, the 
medial cingulate cortex (MCC) and bilateral dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). In 
contrast rTPJ showed significantly stronger functional connectivity compared to rSMG, to the 
left TPJ, precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and MPFC (see Figure 3.3 and Table 
3.3). These results of different connectivity profiles for rSMG and rTPJ converge nicely with 
other parcellations of the temporo-parietal region (Bzdok et al., 2013; Mars et al., 2012). To 
investigate possible group differences in functional connectivity in the rSMG or the rTPJ 
network between ASD participants and healthy controls, we tested for an interaction between 
connectivity difference and group. Findings revealed significant differences in rTPJ (FWE < 
.05, Figure 3.4A) but not rSMG (Figure 3.4B) functional connectivity between the two groups 
(see also Table 3.3). Individuals with ASD displayed significantly reduced functional 
connectivity from rTPJ to lTPJ, precuneus, PCC, and MPFC. In addition a regression analysis 
within the rTPJ network using ADOS social interaction scores revealed that with increasing 








Figure 3.3. Display of the rSMG and the rTPJ network. Seed-based resting-state functional 
connectivity analysis revealed marked divergent connectivity profiles for rSMG and rTPJ (FWE < 
.05). RSMG shows greater functional coupling compared to rTPJ with lSMG, bilateral AI, IFG, 
DLPFC and MCC. Whereas rTPJ shows greater functional coupling compared to rSMG with lTPJ, 
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Figure 3.4. (A) Display of significant group difference in resting-state connectivity in the rTPJ 
network. Findings revealed significant differences in rTPJ but not rSMG functional connectivity 
between the two groups, with individuals with ASD showing reduced functional connectivity from 
rTPJ to lTPJ, precuneus, PCC and MPFC (FWE < .05, cluster corrected). (B) No significant group 
difference in resting-state connectivity in the rSMG network (FWE < .05, cluster corrected). (C) Brain 
regions showing increased coupling during rest with rTPJ with decreasing symptom severity (ADOS 
social interaction) within the ASD sample (FWE < .05, cluster corrected). Stronger connectivity 





Previous studies have reported consistent findings on ToM deficits in ASD, however evidence 
for deficits in empathy in ASD has remained inconsistent, thus demanding a more detailed 
investigation. In the first study we focused on behaviourally investigating a more specific 
socio-affective ability, namely overcoming emotional egocentricity during empathic relating 
in individuals with ASD using the EEB Touch-paradigm (ETOP, Silani et al., 2013), while 
also assessing ToM abilities with an established task (Dziobek et al., 2006). In addition, Study 
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2 aimed to shed light on the integrity of neuronal networks associated with overcoming 
egocentricity (through self-other distinction) during empathy and ToM in ASD.  
Study 1 found in line with the literature, that individuals with ASD show deficits in 
ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron‐Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; 
Castelli et al., 2002; Dziobek et al., 2006; Happé, 1994; Klin, 2000). However, using the 
previously established ETOP, both, ASD participants and healthy controls, showed a 
significant EEB, comparable in size, suggesting no enhanced emotional egocentricity in ASD, 
and implicating relatively intact self-other distinction during empathic relating. Thus, 
according to these results, individuals with ASD are not more prone to project their own 
feelings onto others / bias their perception of feelings of others towards their own feelings 
than neurotypical individuals. Additionally, in ASD participants, ToM abilities were 
significantly related to symptom severity, while the EEB was not. These behavioural findings 
suggest that individuals with ASD might have specific deficits in ToM but not in self-other 
distinction during empathic relating, extending previous findings of intact empathy, that this 
is also the case even when emotional states between oneself and others are incongruent. The 
finding of an equally sized EEB in ASD as compared to healthy controls suggests that a more 
detailed account of social cognition deficits in ASD is required, in line with previous findings 
of spared socio-affective abilities (Bird et al., 2010; Hadjikhani et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2010; 
Lockwood et al., 2013; Rogers et al., 2007). 
The analyses of Study 2 of networks underlying overcoming emotional egocentricity 
during empathy and ToM, showed that rSMG and rTPJ display highly specific resting-state 
connectivity profiles, further supporting the view of a functional segregation of these two 
networks (Silani et al., 2013). The rSMG, relative to rTPJ, was significantly connected to 
bilateral AI, MCC, i.e., regions which have been consistently shown to play a crucial role in 
emotion processing such as during interoception and empathy (Lamm et al., 2011; Singer et 
al., 2009; Singer et al., 2004). The rTPJ, relative to the rSMG, was in contrast predominantly 
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connected with PCC, precuneus, MPFC, and lTPJ, all regions commonly associated with 
cognitive processes such as attentional processing, default mode brain function, as well as 
ToM. These differing resting-state profiles of rSMG and rTPJ are in accordance with similar 
parcellations of the temporo-parietal junction  (Bzdok et al., 2013; Mars et al., 2012).  
More importantly, the direct comparison of these networks between the healthy 
control and ASD samples revealed that in line with the behavioural patterns observed in Study 
1, ASD participants displayed abnormal resting-state connectivity in the ToM network with 
significantly decreased functional connectivity of the rTPJ to the MPFC, PCC and lTPJ, but 
no significant functional connectivity decrease in the rSMG network. Additionally, symptom 
severity was shown to correlate negatively with increasing rTPJ/PCC coupling, speaking to 
the importance of the ToM network abnormalities in contributing to autistic symptomatology. 
These findings are in accordance with influential “disconnection theories” of ASD, suggesting 
that a disruption of a combination of frontotemporal, frontolimbic, frontoparietal and 
interhemispheric connections might be at the heart of the autistic condition (Belmonte et al., 
2004; Courchesne & Pierce, 2005; Geschwind & Levitt, 2007; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, 
Kana, & Minshew, 2007; Just, Keller, Malave, Kana, & Varma, 2012). One problem of the 
“disconnection theories” of ASD is the lack of specificity, being short of explanation to why 
some abilities in ASD are deficient, some remain spared and some even seem to be enhanced 
(Geschwind & Levitt, 2007). Our results suggest that in the case of the temporo-parietal 
cortex in ASD, disrupted functional connectivity to other regions of the brain might be highly 
specific to TPJ but not the adjacent SMG, indicating that underconnectivity in ASD might just 
pertain to very specific brain networks. In sum, these resting-state connectivity findings 
complement our behavioural findings of unaffected emotional self-other distinction during 
empathy in ASD but deficient ToM. They suggest that intact functioning of the rSMG 
network links with intact self-other distinction during empathy in ASD, while aberrant 
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functioning of the rTPJ network possibly contributes to ToM deficits which in turn add to the 
autistic symptomatology. 
Taken together, this study provides novel evidence that self-other distinction deficits 
and resulting egocentricity in ASD are mainly present in the cognitive domain, not extending 
into the affective domain of empathy. The finding of intact emotional self-other distinction is 
in accordance with some other findings showing partly intact empathic responding in ASD 
without comorbid alexithymia (Bird et al., 2010; Hadjikhani et al., 2014; Silani et al., 2008). 
Thus, importantly individuals with ASD exhibit even intact empathic relating, when self and 
other are in different emotional states, which represents another spared socio-affective ability 
in ASD. Together this study and previous ones point to the need to closely reconsider the 
exact features of the social deficits portrayed in ASD and to strive for a more fine-grained 
characterization of this developmental disorder. Identifying areas of intact functioning in ASD 
could help to inform targeted-intervention programs and in the case of spared socio-affective 
abilities could play a major role as compensatory mechanisms in therapy. 
Limitations 
It would have been favorable to perform the resting-state connectivity analyses on the 
behaviourally tested sample. Unfortunately however, as mentioned in the method section, 
resting-state scans were not available for the behavioural sample. On the upside the use of a 
large independent sample for the resting-state connectivity analyses, diminishes concerns 
about possible power issues for detecting effects.  
In conclusion, this study demonstrated that while individuals with ASD exhibited 
known deficits in ToM, emotional egocentricity was comparable to that of healthy controls, 
suggesting intact self-other distinction during empathic relating. Importantly, via brain 
analyses we were able to associate self-other distinction during empathy on the one hand and 
ToM on the other to clearly divergent resting-state connectivity profiles with two adjacent 
seed regions in the right temporo-parietal junction, the rTPJ and rSMG, thus replicating 
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previous findings. Importantly, and in line with the behavioural results, only the connectivity 
from rTPJ and not rSMG was significantly reduced for ASD patients compared to controls. 
This suggests that unlike ToM and its associated underlying rTPJ network, self-other 
distinction during empathy and its underlying rSMG network remain spared in individuals 
with ASD. These findings provide further detail for a more fine-grained characterization of 
social deficits in ASD, providing evidence for spared social-affective functioning, but 
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Preserved self-other distinction during empathy in autism is linked to network integrity 






The Autism Brain Imaging Data Exchange (ABIDE) database, provides structural and 
functional MRI data together with clinical and demographic information from individuals 
with ASD and healthy controls (Di Martino et al., 2013). ASD diagnosis was based on expert 
clinical opinion and the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, ADOS (Lord et al., 2000), 
and/or the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised, ADI-R (Lord et al., 1994). More detailed 
information about the ABIDE consortium and site-specific details are available at 
http://fcon_1000.projects.nitric.org/indi/abide.  
The sample selected for this study consisted of male participants from 7 different sites: 
1) California Institute of Technology (n = 26, 13 ASDs, 13 healthy controls); 2) University of 
Leuven (n = 27, 13 ASDs, 14 healthy controls); 3) Olin, Institute of Living at Hartford 
Hospital (n = 10, 5 ASDs, 5 healthy controls); 4) University of Pittsburgh, School of 
Medicine (n = 21, 10 ASDs, 11 healthy controls); 5) Trinity Centre for Health Sciences (n = 
19, 9 ASDs, 10 healthy controls); 6) University of Utah, School of Medicine (n = 5, 5 healthy 
controls) and 7) University of Michigan (n = 55, 34 ASDs, 21 healthy controls).  
 
EEB Touch-Paradigm (ETOP) 
Before the start, two participants unknown to each other were familiarized with the 
rating scale and performed 6 practice trials for each experimental condition. Participants 
started with the individual conditions which were blocked and counterbalanced. In the 
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individual self condition a picture (size 336 X 336 pixels) appeared on the touch screen (800 x 
600 pixels resolution, 15 inch screen, viewing distance ~ 40 cm) accompanied by a 
corresponding tactile stimulation of the participant’s left hand at 1 Hz for 3000 ms. hidden 
behind a curtain preventing them to observe the different stimulation materials In the 
individual other condition, the trial structure remained the same, but the participant did not 
receive any tactile stimulation. Instead, he was instructed to judge the pleasantness of the 
tactile experience for the other participant based on the picture indicating what tactile 
stimulation the other participant received. Each run consisted of 30 pseudo-randomized trials, 
with 10 pleasant, 10 neutral and 10 unpleasant visuo-tactile stimuli. This resulted in a three-
factorial mixed design with the two within-subjects factors target (self, other judgment) and 
valence (pleasant, neutral and unpleasant stimulation) and the between-subjects factor group 
(healthy controls and ASD). 
In the following simultaneous conditions both participants in the room received tactile 
stimulation simultaneously and were instructed to either judge the pleasantness of their own 
tactile experience (simultaneous self condition) or judge the pleasantness of the tactile 
experience for the other person (simultaneous other condition). In these conditions two 
pictures appeared on the screen, while the left picture with the label “Self” corresponded to 
the tactile stimulation the participant received, the right picture with the label “Other” 
corresponded to the touch the other person received. The touch experiences of the two 
participants could be either affectively congruent or incongruent. The simultaneous conditions 
were blocked and counterbalanced. The EEB was defined as the difference between ratings in 
incongruent and congruent trials when judging the other, as compared to the difference when 
judging one’s own feelings. In this way, the simultaneous self condition served to control for 
general perceptual or cognitive confounds- such as visual and affective stimulus comparison, 
detection of incongruency, or overcoming general response conflict. For the simultaneous 
conditions each run consisted of 40 pseudo-randomized trials, with 20 pleasant (10 
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congruent/10 incongruent) and 20 unpleasant (10 congruent/10 incongruent) visuo-tactile 
stimuli.. This resulted in a four-factorial mixed design with the three within-subjects factors 
target (self, other judgment), valence (pleasant, unpleasant stimulation), and congruence 
(congruent, incongruent stimulation of participant and other) and the between-subjects factor 
group (healthy controls and ASD).  The significant triple interaction of target X congruency 
X group would be indicative of a significant group difference in the size of the EEB. Data 
analysis was performed using the IBM SPSS statistics software, version 19.0.  
 
Resting-state connectivity analysis 
Data were processed using the data processing assistant for the resting-state fMRI 
toolbox (DPARSF, Song et al., 2011) for Matlab. The toolbox is based on the Statistical 
Parametric Mapping toolbox (SPM8, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). In brief, 
preprocessing discarded the first 10 volumes, performed slice time correction, motion 
correction and realignment, and co-registered the functional time series to the corresponding 
T1-weighted MRI. Images underwent DARTEL-based segmentation and registration, 
followed by nuisance covariate regression to remove effects of average WM and CSF signal, 
as well as 6 motion parameters (3 translations and 3 rotations). To deal more thoroughly with 
possible differential motion artifacts in our samples we included the scrubbing approach 
advocated by Power, Barnes, Snyder, Schlaggar, and Petersen (2012), which models bad time 
points (based on the framewise displacement threshold, FD (Power), of 0.5mm or higher; 
together with one time point before and one time point after each such time point] as separate 
regressors during the nuisance covariate correction. Time series were band-pass filtered to be 
within the 0.01 and 0.08 Hz band (Satterthwaite et al., 2013), normalized to MNI space, 
resampled to 3mm voxels, and spatially smoothed using a 8 mm Full-Width-at-Half-
Maximum (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel. The rSMG region was based on the overlap of 
activations from two separate fMRI experiments using the ETOP, which independently 
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confirmed the crucial involvement of rSMG in overcoming the EEB (Silani et al., 2013). The 
rSMG region emerged after the contrast (Other Judgment: Incongruent > Congruent) > (Self 
Judgment: Incongruent > Congruent). The rTPJ region was based on meta-analytic activation 
of rTPJ in story-based and nonstory based ToM studies, collected in a coordinate-based meta-
analysis by Mar (2011). Functional connectivity was calculated as the time series correlation 
between the mean time series of the seed region and the time series of all brain voxels. Time-
series correlation coefficients underwent a Fisher r-to-z transformation to render the data 
more normally distributed.  
 
Results (Individual conditions) 
Investigating whether the emotion induction worked for both groups the individual 
conditions were analysed with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the affective ratings with 
target (self vs. other) and valence (positive, neutral, negative) as within-subjects factors and 
group (ASD vs. healthy controls) as between-subjects factor.  
The results revealed a significant main effect of valence (F1, 96 = 221.48, P < .001, p
2 
= .822), and target (F1, 48 = 8.33, P < .001, p
2 
= .148), as well as a significant target by 
valence (F1, 96 = 13.09, P < .001, p
2 
= .214) and valence by group interaction (F1, 96 = 6.40, p 
< .001, p
2 
= .118). There was no significant main effect of group or further significant 
interaction with group (Fs < 1.84, Ps > .164). Post-hoc tests showed that the ASD group rated 
the negative and positive emotions less intense for self and other. After controlling for 
alexithymia, no group differences remained, indicating equally effective emotion induction 
for both groups by means of visuo-tactile stimulation. 
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Background. Major depressive disorder (MDD) has been associated with deficits in empathy, 
however the exact nature of these deficits and their relation to concurrent alexithymia has 
remained elusive. In this study we tested under which conditions MDD patients show 
deficient empathy, investigating empathic relating during congruent and incongruent 
emotional perspectives of self and other in MDD patients with high and low alexithymia. 
 
Method. Healthy controls and currently depressed MDD patients with low (n = 28, n = 11) or 
high (n = 14, n = 18) alexithymia performed an emotional egocentricity paradigm inducing 
emotions by means of tactile stimulation. This task allowed to measure empathy during a 
simple condition, when simulation suffices, and a complex condition, when emotional 
perspectives of self and other differ. 
 
Results. Only alexithymia but not depression decreased empathy in the simple empathy 
condition. However, when emotional perspectives of self and other differ, MDD patients 
showed an egocentric bias during empathic judgments and an altercentric bias during 
emotional self judgments (suggesting heightened emotional contagion), both independent of 
alexithymia. Across the entire sample, alexithymia decreased the size of the egocentric bias 
during empathic judgments.  
 
Conclusions. These results suggest that MDD patients show intact empathic judgments, when 
simple simulation is not hampered by concurrent alexithymia. In more complex situations 
when simulation alone does not suffice and incongruent emotional perspectives of self and 
other have to be resolved, MDD patients are prone to egocentric and altercentric biases. 
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Introduction 
Depression is often characterized by deficits in social functioning (Hirschfeld et al., 2000).  
Empathy, the ability to understand and share feelings of others represents an important 
cornerstone of social cognition as the affective route to understanding others (Singer, 2012; 
Singer et al., 2004). Findings of empathic deficits in depression have been mixed so far 
(Thoma et al., 2011; Wilbertz et al., 2010; Wolkenstein et al., 2011), with the greatest 
consensus on heightened empathic distress (Schreiter & Pijnenborg, 2013). This lack of clear 
evidence for empathy deficits in depression may be related to two important reasons. First, the 
emotional states of self and other during empathy tasks have never been varied, which 
however, as we will argue later, is particularly relevant to more complex everyday empathic 
relating. Secondly, and very importantly alexithymia, a common comorbid personality trait in 
depression (Honkalampi et al., 2000; Taylor & Bagby, 2004), associated with deficits in 
empathy and emotional awareness (Bird et al., 2010; Moriguchi et al., 2007; Silani et al., 
2008), has commonly not been accounted for. Thus, in this study we aimed to address these 
issues to arrive at a more comprehensive picture of empathic relating in depression. 
  Generally human interpersonal understanding often relies on mechanisms of self 
simulation, as for example in the case of empathy, where one’s own feeling states tend to be 
used to simulate the feeling state of another (Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Brass et al., 2009; 
Decety & Lamm, 2007; Gallese, 2001, 2007; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Mitchell, 2009; 
Nickerson, 2001; Silani et al., 2013; Singer, 2012; Singer et al., 2004; Van Boven & 
Loewenstein, 2003). However such simulation mechanisms fail in making sense of other’s 
mental states in situations where mental states of self and other clearly differ. For instance it 
would be erroneous to assume that someone was happy just because we ourselves feel happy, 
when he is clearly sad. Thus, one important aspect when considering empathic relating is the 
congruency of the emotional perspectives of self and other. In everyday situations, empathic 
relating becomes much more complex, as emotional perspective of self and other are not 
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always perfectly aligned but are instead often very different. In these cases, simple simulation 
mechanisms fail and resulting egocentric biases need to be overcome to arrive at accurate 
empathic judgments. A recent study demonstrated, that healthy adults do show an egocentric 
bias during empathic relating, while functioning of the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) was 
involved in overcoming such emotional egocentricity. In addition two developmental studies 
provided evidence for increased emotional egocentricity during empathic relating in children 
relative to adults, which was associated with deficits in emotional conflict processing and 
reduced functional coupling of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) with rSMG 
(Hoffmann, Singer, & Steinbeis, in press; Steinbeis et al., 2014). 
Evidence of increased egocentric bias during empathic relating in depression is 
however sparse and comes mostly from clinical reports and anecdotal evidence, an 
experimental investigation is yet missing. Findings of deficient emotion regulation abilities 
(Bermpohl et al., 2009; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Kanske et al., 2012), heightened 
processing of negative stimuli (Leppänen, 2006; Sterzer et al., 2011) and deficient emotional 
and non-emotional emotional conflict processing (Etkin & Schatzberg, 2011; Kanske & Kotz, 
2012; F. Murphy et al., 1999; Paelecke-Habermann et al., 2005; Waring et al., 2013) could 
suggest that individuals with depression, even if they possess intact simulation under simple 
empathy conditions, might show difficulties and egocentric bias under more complex 
empathy conditions, when needing to detach from their own emotional perspective to take the 
incongruent emotional perspective of another person. 
While empathic judgments of another persons’ emotional perspective can be 
influenced by an egocentric bias, emotional judgments of one’s own emotional perspective 
can also be influenced by another persons’ emotional perspective, leading to an altercentric 
bias. Such an altercentric bias during emotional self judgments, represents a form of 
emotional contagion, the automatic and implicit tendency to resonate and be affected by 
another person’s emotional perspective (Singer & Lamm, 2009). To investigate the 
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altercentric bias during empathic self judgments in depression, is of interest as for example 
heightened personal distress is commonly reported in depression (Schreiter & Pijnenborg, 
2013). Personal distress represents a self-oriented, aversive emotional reaction, such as 
anxiety or discomfort, towards another person’s emotional state (Davis, 1980), thus possibly 
suggesting that individuals with depression have difficulties detaching emotional perspectives 
of others from their own, showing heightened emotional contagion.  
Whether under simple or more complex empathy conditions, alexithymia, a common 
comorbid personality trait in recurrent depressive disorder (Honkalampi et al., 2000; Taylor & 
Bagby, 2004), needs to be accounted for as it has been associated with deficits in empathy and 
emotional awareness (Bird et al., 2010; Moriguchi et al., 2007; Silani et al., 2008). 
Alexithymia is characterized by difficulties in identifying and describing one’s own emotional 
perspective (Sifneos, 1973), and has been shown to be normally distributed in the general 
population (Franz et al., 2008). Deficits in empathy and emotional awareness in depression 
might thus be dependent on concurrent alexithymia, rather than the diagnosis of depression 
itself. Initial evidence from autism spectrum disorder (ASD) suggests that some deficits in 
empathy in ASD can be explained by comorbid alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013). 
Alexithymia is linked among other brain regions to functioning of the anterior insula, which 
represents an important node of the rSMG network (Bird et al., 2010; Silani et al., 2013; 
Steinbeis et al., 2014). It therefore seems crucial to further elucidate the role of alexithymia in 
relation to empathic relating, under simple conditions, when emotional perspectives of self 
and other do not differ and under complex conditions, when emotional perspectives of self 
and other do differ. As the findings above suggest, alexithymia affects empathic simulation 
during simple conditions in healthy controls and in ASD and most likely also in depression. 
How alexithymia affects empathic relating under complex conditions in healthy controls as 
well as in depression remains unknown. It could be suggested that individuals with 
alexithymia would experience diminished emotional conflict due to diminished emotional 
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awareness, finding it easier to detach from their own emotional perspective during empathic 
relating, leading to a decreased egocentric bias. Emotional contagion on the other hand, being 
a largely unconscious process, might be less affected by alexithymia thus, levels of emotional 
awareness. 
In this study we used the established Emotional Egocentricity Bias (EEB) Touch-
Paradigm (ETOP, Silani et al., 2013), which allows to measure empathic relating under 
simple and complex conditions, varying the emotional perspectives of self and other. Thus the 
first aim of this study was to investigate empathic relating in depressed patients and healthy 
controls under simple conditions, when simple simulation mechanisms suffice to arrive at an 
accurate empathic judgment. The second aim was to investigate empathic relating in 
depressed patients and healthy controls under complex conditions, when emotional 
perspectives of self and other differ, and egocentric bias during empathic judgments and 
altercentric bias, i.e. heightened emotional contagion during emotional self judgments, can 
emerge. It has to be noted that in some previous studies on egocentric bias during empathic 
relating in healthy adults and children (Hoffmann et al., in press; Silani et al., 2013) the 
altercentric interference has been minimal and subtracted from the egocentric bias. Since the 
altercentric bias as a form of emotional contagion is of interest on its own in the present study, 
we analyze the two types of bias separately. The third aim was to investigate the role of 
alexithymia on empathic relating under both simple and complex conditions. We therefore 
tested depressed patients and healthy controls with high and low alexithymia. 
In sum we hypothesized first, that if simulation processes are intact in depression, 
depressed patients might show normal empathic relating under simple conditions, when 
alexithymia is controlled for. Secondly we expected individuals with depression to have 
particular problems in resolving conflicting emotional perspectives, thus suggesting increased 
egocentric and altercentric biases relative to healthy controls, during empathic relating under 
complex conditions. Connected to this hypothesis, we expected both biases to be greater in 
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depression, when negative perspectives have to be detached from, considering that depression 
has been associated with heightened processing of negative stimuli. Third, alexithymia was 
hypothesized to influence the size of the egocentric bias during empathic relating, as less 
emotional awareness should decrease the emotional conflict between the different 
perspectives. Fourth, we expected, that alexithymia would have less of an influence on the 






29 patients with depression were recruited through the inpatient clinic of the Charité-
Universitätsmedizin Berlin, or were referred to us by specialized clinicians. 42 healthy control 
(HC) participants matched to the patients in terms of years of education, age and gender with 
no history of psychiatric or neurological disorders were recruited by public notices and from 
project databases of the Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin and the Freie Universität Berlin. 
Participants were assessed for psychiatric disorders using a structured clinical interview 
(SCID-I; Wittchen, Wunderlich, Gruschwitz, & Zaudig, 1997). Diagnosis of acute state of 
depression as according to DSM-IV was confirmed with no other primary diagnoses using the 
SCID-I. All participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Hautzinger, Bailer, 
Worall, & Keller, 1995), and were also assessed with the Hamilton Depression Rating Sale 
(HAMD-17, M. Hamilton, 1960). Additionally, participants completed the Toronto 
alexithymia scale (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994), and a measure of crystallized intelligence 
(Wortschatztest, WST, a vocabulary test part of the HAWIE-R, the German adaptation of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Schmidt & Metzler, 1992) (see Table 1). All MDD 
patients were medicated. There were significant group differences in terms of age and 
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crystalline IQ. Healthy participants had a higher mean age, while the crystalline IQ was 
slightly lower for the MDD group compared to the healthy controls. Therefore, age and 
crystalline IQ were used as covariates in all analyses. 
Low and high alexithymia was defined based on a large representative German 
population sample (Franz et al., 2008). The 66
th
 percentile equaling the TAS -20 sum core of 
53 for men and 52 for women was used as a cut-off to represent high alexithymia. We used 
this cut-off to distinguish between individuals with high alexithymia (equal to and above 
53/52) and those with low alexithymia (below 53/52).  
 
 
Table 4.1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of the participants 
 
d = significant depression group main effect; a = significant alexithymia group main effect; d * a = 
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EEB Touch-Paradigm (ETOP) 
The design and procedure of this paradigm was identical to that reported in Silani et al. 
(2013). Participants unknown to each other were assigned pairwise to an experimental 
session. Sitting back to back in front of a touch screen (800 x 600 pixels resolution, 15 inch 
screen, viewing distance ~40 cm) they were asked to rate the pleasantness or unpleasantness 
of the tactile stimulation of their left palm hidden behind a curtain preventing them to observe 
the different stimulation materials. Before the start, participants were familiarized with the 
rating scale and performed 6 practice trials for each experimental condition. Participants 
started with the simple conditions instructed to either judge the pleasantness of their own 
touch stimulation (individual self condition) or the pleasantness of the tactile stimulation for 
the other person (individual other condition). The simple conditions were blocked and 
counterbalanced. In the individual self condition a picture appeared on the screen 
accompanied by a corresponding tactile stimulation of the participant’s left hand at 1 Hz for 
3000 ms (e.g. a picture of a rose while the participant was touched by a silky object). 
Immediately after the stimulation phase participants judged the pleasantness or 
unpleasantness of the tactile experience by using a rating scale (ranging from -10 to 10) on the 
touch screen, within 3000 ms response time. In the individual other condition, the trial 
structure was the same, but the participant did not receive any tactile stimulation. Instead, he 
was instructed to judge the pleasantness of the tactile experience for the other participant 
based on the picture indicating what tactile stimulation the other participant received. Each 
run consisted of 30 pseudo-randomized trials, with 10 pleasant, 10 neutral and 10 unpleasant 
visuo-tactile stimuli. This resulted in a four-factorial mixed design with the two within-
subjects factors target (self, other judgment) and valence (pleasant, neutral and unpleasant 
stimulation) and the between-subjects factors depression group (healthy controls and MDD 
patients) and alexithymia group (high alexithymia  and low alexithymia). 
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In the following complex conditions both participants in the room received tactile stimulation 
simultaneously, and were instructed to either judge the pleasantness of their own tactile 
experience (simultaneous self condition) or judge the pleasantness of the tactile experience for 
the other person (simultaneous other condition).  The complex conditions were blocked and 
counterbalanced. In these conditions two pictures appeared on the screen, while the left 
picture with the label “Self” on top corresponded to the tactile stimulation that the participant 
received, the right picture with the label “Other” corresponded to the touch that the other 
person received. The touch experiences of the two participants could be either affectively 
congruent (e.g. both touched by pleasant materials, e.g. silk and fur) or incongruent (e.g. one 
gets touched by a pleasant, the other by an unpleasant material, e.g. silk and rubber spider). 
The EEB was defined as the difference between ratings in incongruent and congruent trials 
when judging the other, as compared to the difference when judging one’s own emotion. For 
the complex conditions each run consisted of 40 pseudo-randomized trials, with 20 pleasant 
(10 congruent/10 incongruent) and 20 unpleasant (10 congruent/10 incongruent) visuo-tactile 
stimuli. This resulted in a four-factorial mixed design with the three within-subjects factors 
target (self, other judgment), valence (pleasant, unpleasant stimulation), and congruence 
(congruent, incongruent stimulation of participant and other) and the between-subjects factor 
group (healthy controls and MDD patients) and alexithymia group (high alexithymia  and low 




Inhibitory control was assessed with a Go/NoGo task, to control for differences in 
executive functions. In this task a blue square represented a Go stimulus and a red square a 
NoGo stimulus (intertrial intervals randomly 950 ms or 1500 ms). 90 Go trials and 60 NoGo 
trials were randomly presented. Participants had to respond quickly with a button-press to the 
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presentation of the Go stimuli, while withholding a response to the presentation of the NoGo 
stimuli. Response inhibition was measured by the ability to inhibit successfully the response 
to NoGo stimuli. A d-prime score was calculated as measure of response sensitivity (d' = Z(hit 
rate) - Z(false alarm rate)). 
 
Empathy trait measure 
Trait empathy was assessed with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 
1980), differentiating empathy into 4 components (empathic concern, personal distress, 





EEB Touch-Paradigm (ETOP) 
 
Simple conditions. Investigating whether empathic simulation is intact in depression, 
the simple conditions were analysed with an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on the 
affective ratings with target (self vs. other) and valence (positive, neutral, negative) as within-
subjects factors and depression group (depressed patients vs. healthy controls) and 
alexithymia group (high alexithymia vs. low alexithymia) as between-subjects factors and 
age, education, and crystalline IQ as covariates.  
The results revealed a significant main effect of valence (F2, 128 = 115.411, p < .001, 
p
2 
= .194), and a marginally significant main effect of alexithymia group (F1, 64 = 3.441, p = 
.068, p
2 
= .051). There were no further significant main effects or interactions (Fs < 1.990, ps 
> .141). The data indicates that empathic simulation as well as emotional interoception are 
intact in depression, and only decreased by alexithymia (see Figure 4.1a). 
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Complex conditions. In previous studies simultaneous other and self ratings have 
been included in a single model, to investigate for a stronger egocentric effect against the 
altercentric effect. Because of our interest in both the egocentric and altercentric effects, we 
mainly analysed them separately, but used the previous model first to to replicate previous 
findings. An ANCOVA on the affective ratings with target (self, other), congruency 
(congruent, incongruent), and valence (positive, negative) as within-subjects factors and 
depression group and alexithymia group as between-subjects factors, as well as age, 
education, and crystalline IQ as covariates was performed. There was a significant target by 
congruency by alexithymia group interaction (F1, 64 = 5.946, p = 0.018, p
2 
= 0.085), but no 
significant target by congruency by depression group interaction (F1, 64 = 1.094, p = 0.300, 
p
2 
= 0.017), suggesting that the extent of egocentric bias against the altercentric bias was not 
modulated by depression, but by alexithymia. This suggests that the emotional egocentricity 
as measured with the typical EEB, decreased with alexithymia. 
To look specifically at an egocentric bias during empathic relating, not subtracting the 
altercentric bias, we analysed the simultaneous other ratings separately. There was a 
significant main effect of congruency (F1, 64 = 4.281, p = 0.043, p
2 
= 0.063). Importantly 
there was a marginally significant congruency by depression group interaction (F1, 64 = 3.379, 
p = 0.071, p
2 
= 0.050), and a significant congruency by alexithymia group interaction (F1, 64 
= 5.560, p = 0.021, p
2 
= 0.080), as well as a significant congruency by emotion by 
depression group interaction (F1, 64 = 7.817, p = 0.007, p
2 
= 0.109).  Response inhibition as 
measured with the d-prime score, did not account for the increased egocentric bias in 
depression (F1, 64 = 3.379, p = 0.071, p
2 
= 0.050).  These results do indeed suggest increased 
egocentric bias during empathic relating under complex conditions for depressed patients 
compared to healthy controls, while high alexithymia significantly decreased the egocentric 
bias (see Figure 4.1b). 




Figure 4.1. (a) Empathic simulation during simple condition (simple conditions). Depressed patients 
showed intact empathic simulation. Alexithymia decreased empathic simulation, independently of 
depression (b) Depressed patients showed an increased egocentric bias during empathic relating (Other 
incongruent – Other congruent) under the complex condition, independently of alexithymia. 
Alexithymia decreased the egocentric bias independently of depression. 
 
 
To look specifically at an altercentric bias during emotional self judgments, we 
analysed the simultaneous self ratings separately. There was a significant main effect of 
alexithymia group (F1, 64 = 5.484, p = 0.022, p
2 
= 0.079) and a significant congruency by 
depression group interaction (F1, 64 = 12.498, p = 0.001, p
2 
= 0.163), but no significant 
congruency by alexithymia group interaction (F1, 64 = 0.312, p = 0.578, p
2 
= 0.005). 
Additionally there was a marginal congruency by valence by depression group interaction (F1, 
64 = 3.897, p = 0.053, p
2 
= 0.057). There were no other significant main effects and 
interactions (Fs < 2.060, ps > .156). Response inhibition as measured with the d-prime score, 
did not account for the increased altercentric bias in (F1, 64 = 3.379, p = 0.071, p
2 
= 0.050). 
These results suggest that depressed patients show a significantly increased altercentric bias 
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(F1, 66 = 13.489, p < 0.001, p
2 
= 0.70) during emotional self judgments, irrespective of 
alexithymia (see Figure 4.2a).  
Egocentric bias and altercentric bias were correlated for both healthy controls (r = 
.533, p < .001) and depressed patients (r = .658, p < .001). There was a relationship between 
the egocentric bias and symptom severity (r = -.408, p = .028), which was accounted for by 
alexithymia (partial correlation: r = -.105, p = .589). The altercentric bias showed a positive 




Figure 4.2. (a) Altercentric bias during emotional self judgments (Self incongruent – Self congruent), 
i.e. emotional contagion. MDD patients showed increased emotional contagion, unaffected by 
alexithymia. (b) Significant positive correlation over the entire sample between emotional contagion 
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Inhibitory control 
To investigate differences in inhibitory control an ANCOVA with depression group 
and alexithymia group as between-subjects factors, as well as  age, education and crystalline 
IQ as covariates was performed on the d-prime scores. There were no significant main effects 
of depression group (F1, 64 = 0.005, p = 0.941, p
2 
< 0.001) and alexithymia group (F1, 64 = 
1.688, p = 0.198, p
2 
= 0.026), and no significant depression group by alexithymia group 
interaction (F1, 64 = 0.238, p = 0.628, p
2 
= 0.004). These results showed that there were no 
differences in response inhibition between the groups.  
 
Empathy trait measure 
ANCOVAs on the different subscales of the IRI (empathic concern, perspective-
taking, personal distress, fantasy) with depression group and alexithymia group as between-
subjects factors as well as age, education and crystalline IQ as covariates were performed. 
Individuals with depression exhibited significantly more personal distress than healthy 
controls (F1, 61 = 14.929, p < 0.001, p
2 
= 0.197). Individuals with high alexithymia also 
showed a tendency for more personal distress than individuals with low alexithymia (F1, 61 = 
3.040, p = 0.086, p
2 
= 0.047). Individuals with high alexithymia showed lower perspective-
taking than individuals with low alexithymia (F1, 61 = 9.527, p = 0.003, p
2 
= 0.135). There 
was a significant positive correlation over the entire sample of empathic distress (see Figure 
4.2b) and empathic concern with the altercentric bias in the ETOP (r = .312, p = .010; r = 
.242, p = .047). Controlling personal distress and empathic concern against each other only 
the personal distress association with the altercentric bias remained. 
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Discussion 
This study aimed to arrive at a more comprehensive picture of empathic relating in 
depression, in further elucidating the role of alexithymia while looking at empathic relating 
under simple and complex conditions, manipulating the congruency of emotional perspectives 
of self and other. 
As hypothesized, we found that only alexithymia but not depression itself accounted 
for deficits in empathic relating under the simple condition, when simulation mechanisms 
suffice to arrive at an accurate empathic judgment of another persons’ emotional perspective. 
This represents an important finding, suggesting intact empathic relating based on simulation 
in individuals with depression, when alexithymia is accounted for.  
Looking at the complex condition, when emotional perspectives of self and other 
differ, depressed patients exhibited an increased egocentric bias during empathic relating 
under the complex condition suggesting that they have difficulties in detaching from their 
own egocentric perspective to empathically relate to the incongruent emotional perspective of 
the other. Previous studies linked increased egocentric bias during empathic relating in 
children to decreased functional coupling of lDLPFC with rSMG (Steinbeis et al., 2014) and 
emotional conflict processing deficits (Hoffmann et al., in press). Albeit speculative it could 
be suggested that also in depression, it is deficits particularly in emotional conflict resolution, 
possibly related to poor functioning of DLPFC, that explain increased egocentric bias during 
empathic relating in these participants. Deficits in emotional and non-emotional emotional 
conflict processing and DLPFC functioning have been commonly reported for depression 
(Etkin & Schatzberg, 2011; Grimm et al., 2008; C. F. Murphy et al., 2007; Siegle, Thompson, 
Carter, Steinhauer, & Thase, 2007; Waring et al., 2013; Wolkenstein et al, 2014). This would 
suggest that the egocentric bias during empathic relating in depression is not a problem of 
empathic relating as simulation processes are intact under simple conditions, but rather a 
problem of resolving conflicting emotional perspectives under more complex conditions.  
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Besides increased egocentric bias during empathic relating depressed patients also 
showed an increased altercentric bias during emotional self judgments, suggesting a 
heightened emotional contagion in this population. Indeed individual differences in personal 
distress across the entire sample correlated positively with the altercentric bias, indicating that 
part of the heightened emotional contagion can be attributed to high personal distress, which 
is commonly reported for depression (Schreiter & Pijnenborg, 2013). Interestingly the size of 
the emotional contagion in depressed patients, as measured by the altercentric bias was 
positively associated with the average length of the depressive episodes. The heightened 
emotional contagion to other’s emotional perspectives, seems to somehow contribute to 
perpetuating the depressive state. Thus, this might represent a need in depressed patients to 
monitor the relationship with others, possibly related to previously described rejection 
sensitivity (Ayduk, Downey, & Kim, 2001; Tops, Riese, Oldehinkel, Rijsdijk, & Ormel, 
2008), insecure attachment patterns (Roberts, Gotlib, & Kassel, 1996), loss anticipation, and 
general threat detection (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004).  
Last we hypothesized that alexithymia would have a stronger affect on the egocentric 
bias during empathic judgments, than on emotional contagion. Indeed independently of 
depression individuals with high alexithymia showed a smaller egocentric bias during 
empathic judgments, but no changed emotional contagion. As alexithymia has been 
associated with decreased emotional awareness (Bird et al., 2010; Silani et al., 2008), it is 
likely that individuals with high alexithymia do not experience a strong emotional conflict 
and find it easier to detach from their own emotional perspective, while relating to the 
emotional perspective of another person. This could possibly relate to decreased functioning 
of the anterior insular within the empathy network (Silani et al., 2013; Steinbeis et al., 2014), 
which has been previously found to show decreased activation in alexithymia (Bird et al., 
2010; Silani et al., 2008). In contrast emotional contagion was not modulated by alexithymia, 
which could be explained by the fact that emotional contagion is an automatic and seemingly 
4.  Manuscript of Study 3 
126 
unconscious process, less affected by the level of emotional awareness. Contributing to this 
explanation are the findings that personal distress is generally not decreased in individuals 
with high alexithymia, sometimes even increased as was found in this study. Other studies 
have indeed reported personal distress and emotional arousal in alexithymia, suggesting 
automatic emotional resonance is intact in individuals with high alexithymia (Grynberg, 
Luminet, Corneille, Grèzes, & Berthoz, 2010; Stone & Nielson, 2001; Taylor & Bagby, 2004) 
Egocentric bias during empathic relating and emotional contagion showed a positive 
relation in our study. This might suggest that partly the same mechanism could underlie these 
two biases. While response inhibition did not show any association with the egocentric and 
altercentric biases, emotional conflict processing could represent a viable underlying 
mechanism, as suggested above. The role of emotional conflict processing in empathic 
relating of individuals with depression under complex conditions when self and other 
perspectives differ, should be further elucidated in future studies.  
Lastly we had hypothesized valence-dependent effects, specifically under complex 
empathy conditions. Against our hypotheses, depressed patients also showed heightened 
egocentric bias, when they had to detach from their own positive perspective to take the 
negative perspective of the other. Depressed patients also showed stronger emotional 
contagion towards the positive emotional perspective of another. Considering the normally 
heightened processing of negative stimuli in depression, this finding was surprising. 
Egocentric and altercentric bias also showed a tendency to be stronger in healthy controls 
when a positive perspective had to be detached from, which could suggest that the positive 
stimuli, might have been more distracting in general. 
The present findings represent an important step towards a more detailed description 
of empathic relating in depression and are consequentially of clinical relevance. 
Psychotherapeutic intervention heavily relies on building a therapeutic alliance between 
patient and psychotherapist that is based on empathic understanding. This study delivers 
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evidence that empathic relating based on simulation is intact in depressed patients, when no 
concurrent alexithymia is present. Alexithymia in depression thus will have negative effects 
on the development of a well-functioning therapeutic relationship and favorable therapeutic 
outcome (Ogrodniczuk, Piper, & Joyce, 2005; Sifneos, 1973). Independently of alexithymia, 
depressed patients tend to show difficulties during empathic relating under complex 
conditions, when emotional perspectives of self and other differ, while also showing 
heightened emotional contagion. These difficulties may thus be inherent to the depressive 
condition, and as suggested possibly related to emotional conflict processing abilities.  
In conclusion, this study aimed to investigate empathic abilities in depression more 
fully in testing empathic relating under simple and complex conditions and its relation to 
alexithymia. Individuals with depression showed intact empathic relating based on simulation, 
when no alexithymia was present. In addition, independently of alexithymia, depressed 
patients showed increased egocentric bias during empathic relating under the complex 
condition, when emotional perspectives of self and other differed, as well as increased 
emotional contagion during emotional self judgments. These findings represent a crucial step 
forward in clarifying in what way, and under what circumstances individuals with depression 
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